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Federalism, External Affairs and Treaties: Recent Developments
in Australia
by Gary A. Rumble*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federalism is a loose concept. Most would say that federalism essen-
tially involves the continued separate existence of the component parts
or states of the federation. Some would say that federalism essentially
involves a division of legislative authority.I Arguably, this second typical
characteristic is itself part of the first principle-the continued existence
of states as states.2
On July 1, 1983 the High Court of Australia handed down a deci-
sion--Commonwealth v. Tasmania (The Tasmanian Dam Case)'-which
split the Court and some say signals the end of true federalism in Austra-
lia. The most important general constitutional issue in the case4 .is the
scope of the Commonwealth Parliament's express power in section 51
(xxix) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia to legislate
with respect to "external affairs." That issue had been rehearsed a year
* Lecturer in Law, Australian National University; Ph.D (1984), LL.B. (1975), B.A. (1973),
Australian National University. The author did some of the work for this article while a visiting
scholar at the University of Virginia School of Law, and benefitted from discussions with Professor
L.F.E. Goldie.
I Other characteristics might be considered essential to, or typical of, federalism. See generally
K. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1947) (especially Chapter I which sets out federalism as
independent but coordinate general and regional governments); G. SAWER, MODERN FEDERALISM
(1976) (especially Chapter 1); S. DAVIS, THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE: A JOURNEY THROUGH TIME
IN QUEST OF A MEANING (1978); G. STEvENSoN, UNFULFILLED UNION ch. 1 (1979) However,
this article is limited to the two characteristics of federalism set out in the text. For comparative
discussions of the interaction of federalism with international affairs see K. WHEARE, supra, at ch. 9;
J. HENDRY, TREATIES AND FEDERAL CONSITrUTIONS (1975); R. GHoSH, TREATIES AND FED-
ERAL CONSTrruTIoNS: THEIR MUTUAI. IMPACT (1961); I. BERNIER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AS-
PECTS OF FEDERALISM (1973); see also infra note 10.
2 See infra notes 224-36 and accompanying text.
3 46 Austl. L.R. 625 (1983).
4 Other constitutional issues included the scope of other Commonwealth legislative powers:
§ 51(xx) relating to corporations; § 51(xxvi) relating to races; powers implicit in the Common-
wealth's status as the national government; the operation of overriding prohibitions (§ 51(xxxi)
against acquisition of property other than on just terms, and § 100 against the abridgement of States'
right to reasonable use of rivers for irrigation or conservation, implied prohibitions against intergov-
ernmental interferences). It is the author's understanding that a forthcoming volume of the Federal
Law Review will publish a series of papers on this case.
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earlier in the case of Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen,5 a decision which also
split the High Court (composed of different membership)6 but which did
not receive as much publicity or public reaction in Australia as did the
Tasmanian Dam Case.7 Both cases involved application of section
51(xxix) to implement international treaties.
In Koowarta, Justice Wilson described the general issue and its sig-
nificance thus:
The technological revolution in communications coupled with the
search for peace and security during the decades of this century have
led to the close interdependence of nation with nation. Both economi-
cally and socially the earth is now likened to a global village where the
international community concerns itself increasingly with matters
which formerly were regarded as only of domestic concern. There is
now no limit to the range of matters which may assume an interna-
tional character, and this question is unlikely to change. These consid-
erations underline the importance of identifying clearly the criteria
which will attract to a law of the Parliament the character of a law
with respect to external affairs.8
It is the purpose of this article to discuss what Koowarta and the
Tasmanian Dam Case decided about the Commonwealth of Australia's
"external affairs" power and its use for treaty implementation. More-
over, since the United States Constitution affected the drafting of the
Commonwealth of Australia's Constitution, some comparisons between
the Australian and American experiences of external affairs and federal-
ism will be made.9
II. FEDERAL DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE
The Australian Constitution1° follows the model of the Constitution
of the United States in its division of legislative competence between the
5 39 Austl. L.R. 417 (1982).
6 In Koowarta, the Court was composed of the Chief Justice, Sir Harry Gibbs, and Justices
Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan. After Koowarta, Justice Stephen left the
Court to take up his appointment as Governor-General of Australia and Justice Aickin died. They
were replaced by Justices Deane and Dawson.
7 The decision in the case and reactions to the decision were front page news in every major
newspaper in Australia. See, eg. Canberra Times, July 2, 1983, at' 1, col. 1.
8 39 Austl. L.R. at 479.
9 For a thorough discussion of this aspect of Australian constitutional law before Koowarta and
the Tasmanian Dam Case, see Thomson, A United States Guide to Constitutional Limitations Upon
Treaties as a Source of Australian Municipal Law, 13 U. W. AUSTL. L. REv. 110 (1977); Van Son,
The Australian Constitution: the External Affairs Power and Federalism, 12 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 46
(1982); see also Looper, Limitations on the Treaty Power in Federal States, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1046
(1959).
10 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 12.
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central legislature and the regional legislatures. 1 The Commonwealth
Parliament is given legislative competence over express subject matters, 12
while the state legislatures through the operation of the state constitu-
tions have general lawmaking power for their respective areas. 13 In case
of conflict between a central and a state law, the central law prevails.' 4
The first enumerated legislative power in the Australian Constitu-
tion was adapted from the U.S. Constitution's commerce clause. The
U.S. provision is in these terms: "The Congress shall have power ....
To Regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes."' 5 The Australian provision is: "The
Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws
for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with
respect to: - (i) Trade and commerce with other countries and among
the States . .16
The last express subject matter in the Australian Constitution's list-
ing in section 51 is also an adaptation of a U.S. provision in article I,
section 8. The U.S. power is: "To make all Laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." The Australian
subject matter of power is: "Matters incidental to the execution of any
power vested by this Constitution in the Parliament or in either House
thereof, or in the Government of the Commonwealth, or in the Federal
Judicature, or in any department or officer of the Commonwealth."' 7 It
is accepted in Australian constitutional law that in addition to the ex-
press incidental power of section 51(xxxix), there is an implied power
associated with each of the subject matters of power collected in section
51.18
11 Contrast the Canadian model. The British North America Act, also an act of the Imperial
Parliament (30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3) draws up two lists of specific subject matters of legislative power
and vests one in the central legislature (§ 91) and the other in the provincial legislatures (§ 92). The
residue is vested in the central legislature (§ 91).
12 Most of the Commonwealth Parliament's legislative powers are collected in section 51 of the
Constitution. Section 52 also vests some subject matters of power, not relevant to this article, in the
Commonwealth and makes those subject matters exclusive to the Commonwealth.
13 The Constitutions of the Australian colonies, which were to become states on federation,
consisted primarily of imperial enactments. For the development of the colonial/state constitutions
see generally W. McMINN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA (1979); A. MELBOURNE,
EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AUSTRALIA (rev. by R. Joyce 1963). The colonies'
constitutions were continued by the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia in section 106.
14 AuSTL. CONST. § 109.
15 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
16 AUSTL. CONST. § 51(i).
17 AUSrL. CONST. § 51(xxxix).
Is See. e.g., Le Mesurier v. Connor, 42 C.L.R. 481, 497 (1929). This author discusses else-
where the distinction between the express grant of legislative power in section 51(xxxix) regarding
19841
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The U.S. Supreme Court has found the commerce power (and/or
that which is "necessary and proper" for carrying it into execution)
broad enough to reach many kinds of intrastate activities. That conclu-
sion has been based on the reasoning that those local activities might
have, or might rationally be thought by Congress to have, an effect on
intrastate commerce. 19
The Australian High Court has not given such a broad interpreta-
tion to the commerce power. The U.S. experience has been referred to as
a departure from "true federalism"'2 and the federal principle of the
Australian Constitution has been invoked to prevent the interstate com-
merce power from extending to broad control of local activities.2" The
main judicial device for constraining section 51(i) has been the rule that
the economic effects of local activities on interstate commerce will not
suffice to justify the control of those local activities under the incidental
aspects of section 51(i).22 That rule and the attitude underlying it have
been disincentives for the Commonwealth to seek to justify control of
local activities with chains of cause and possible effects as tenuous as
those accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court in cases such as Wickard v.
Filburn,23 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States 4 and Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Association.5
Some other specific powers in the long list of the Commonwealth of
that which is incidental to the exercise of other legislative powers and the implied power to legislate
in areas incidential to the subject matter, of each grant. Compare in the American context: "Con-
gress. . . may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even
though they involve control of intrastate activities," United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121
(1941), with "[t]he power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce extends to the regulation
through legislative action of activities intrastate which have a substantial effect on the commerce
.... United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 119-20. See Rumble, Section 51 (xxxix) of the Constitu-
tion and the Federal Distribution of Power, 13 FEDERAL L. Rav 182 (1982).
19 See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
20 See Airlines of New South Wales Pty. Ltd. v. New South Wales [No. 2], 113 C.L.R. 54, 115
(1964).
21 Id. at 77-79 (Barwick, C.J., concurring); ia at 106-07 (MeTiernan, J., 6oncurring); itd at
113-15 (Kitto, J., concurring); id. at 143-44 (Menzies, J., concurring); see also Attorney-General
(Western Australia) v. Australian National Airlines Commission, 138 C.L.R. 492, 499 (1976) (Bar-
wick, C.J.); id. at 502-03 (Gibbs, J., concurring); id at 508-11 (Stephen, J., dissenting); id. at 530-31
(Murphy, L, dissenting).
22 See Attorney-General (Western Australia) v. Australian National Airlines Commission, 138
C.L.R. 492, 499 (1976) (Barwick, C.J.); id at 502-04 (Gibbs, J., concurring); id. at 508-11 (Stephen,
J., concurring). Dissenting, Justice Murphy rejected the rule, id. at 529-30.
23 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
24 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
25 452 U.S. 264 (1981). However, this is not to imply that deference by the U.S. judiciary to
Congressional policy making and fact finding of itself means that Congress is not moved by federal-
ism concerns. See generally WECHSLER, Political Safeguards ofFederalism, in SELECTED ESSAYS




Australia's legislative powers allow control of local activities without any
requirement of interstate connection.2 6 However, generally the differ-
ence between the United States and Australia in judicial attitudes to the
respective (similarly expressed) commerce clauses has meant that legisla-
tive competence has hitherto been more centralized in the United States
than in Australia.27
III. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A comparison of the texts of the United States' and the Common-
wealth of Australia's Constitutions signals some basic differences in ap-
proach to external affairs. These textual differences are traceable to
fundamental historical differences. The Constitution of the United States
of America was born of a revolt against perceived excesses and injustices
committed under the executive authority of the British Crown.28 Ac-
cordingly, it is based on distrust of governmental authority and assumes
the desirability of checks and balances. Perhaps nowhere else in the
Constitution are these factors more evident than in the provisions relat-
ing to foreign affairs.29 The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia represented a peaceful devolution of, and derived its authority from
the continuity of, British sovereignty. The Constitution of the Common-
wealth of Australia came into operation as section 9 of the Common-
wealth of Australia Constitution Act, an Act of the (British) Imperial
26 In particular, section 51(xx)'s grant of power to make laws with respect to "Foreign corpora-
tions, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth" has
been relied upon regularly. Section 51(xx) has been held to support legislation both I) regulating
(see, e-g., Strickland v. Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd., 124 C.L.R. 468 (1971)), and 2) protecting (see,
e.g., Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v. Fontana Films Pty. Ltd., 40 Austl.
L.R. 609 (1982)) the intrastate trading activities of such corporations. See also The Queen v. Austra-
lian Industrial Court; Exparte CLM Holdings Pty. Ltd., 136 C.L.R. 235 (1977); Fencott v. Muller,
46 Austl. L.R. 41 (1983). In the Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Aust. L.R. 625 (1983), the World
Heritage Properties Conservation Act § 10 (1983) was upheld under section 51(xx) of the
Constitution.
27 The United States commerce clause has been found to contain not only an express grant of
power to the central legislature but also an implied exclusion of some state control of interstate
commerce. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). No such implication has
been drawn from section 5 1(i) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. The Com-
monwealth Constitution does, however, contain an express provision, section 92, which provides,
inter alia, that "the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse
among the States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely
free." This section has been much litigated and discussed. See generally L. ZINES, THE HIGH
COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION chs. 6-8 (1981); M. COPER, FREEDOM OF INTERSTATE TRADE
(1982). As currently construed § 92 binds both the Commonwealth and the States. James v. Com-
monwealth, 55 C.L.R. 1 (P.C. 1936).
28 See, eg., the Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
29 See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972); F. WILCOX,
CONGRESS, THE ExcUrivE, AND FOREIGN POLICY (1971).
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Parliament.3"
At common law the representation of the nation in foreign affairs is
within the prerogative of the Crown.3 The U.S. Constitution departed
from the common law position32 by making several detailed provisions
which purport to exclude or limit the executive in particular aspects of
foreign affairs. Foremost for the purpose of this article is the involve-
ment of the Senate in treaty making.33
The treaty power in the U.S. Constitution provides that the Presi-
dent can make treaties "by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate" and "provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."34 Self-
executing treaties have the force of law within the United States.35
A reluctance to accept the treaty power, with its onerous restric-
tions, as the focus of U. S. foreign affairs activities, has been present
since the Constitution's creation. 36  Some argue that alternative proce-
dures must exist by which the President can enter international agree-
ments and by which domestic law can deal with international
problems.37 Those who argue for such alternatives to the treaty power
rely primarily on the necessities of national government and international
statehood, and, where agreements are ratified by Congress, the demo-
cratic "legitimacy" of such action.3"
Such arguments have achieved some vindication in U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. The Court has held that Congress has implied power to
make laws for certain aspects of foreign affairs not expressly provided for
30 63 & 64 Vict., ch 12. For a discussion of the historical background to the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Australia, see generally J. QUICK & R. GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED CONSTITU-
TION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 1-252 (1901).
31 Walker v. Baird, [1891] A.C. 491 (P.C.); 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND paras. 984-85
(4th ed. 1974). Australian authorities for this proposition are collected infra note 64.
32 Hamilton emphasized this departure from the common law position: "In this respect, there-
fore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the
British sovereign." THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 448 (A. Hamilton).
33 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The power to declare war vested in Congress by article I, § 8 is
also a limitation of the executive's foreign affairs power.
34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
35 U.S. CONST. art. IV. Additionally, Congress may legislate under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to implement a treaty which is not self-executing. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
See also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("Our Constitution declares a treaty to be
the law of the land. It is consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of
the legislature whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.")
36 McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Inter-
changeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 237-42 (1945) (reviews the United
States experience from the end of the eighteenth century until their time of writing).
37 McDougal & Lans, supra note 36; L. HENKIN supra note 29, at ch. VI. Compare Borchard,
Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664 (1944) with Treaties and Exec-
utive Agreements- A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616 (1945) who argued that the constitutional scope for
non-treaty international agreement was very limited.
38 McDougal & Lans, supra note 36, at 185-86, 534-82; L. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 175.
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in the Constitution. 9 Moreover, the President can bind the United
States under international law to an agreement on any subject matter
without involving either House of Congress.4'
The Supreme Court has indicated that the President can enter into
some international compacts41 which are not treaties requiring the par-
ticipation of the Senate, and which will override state laws and policies.42
It is accepted that the President can make such international agreements
in areas corresponding to express presidential powers;43 however, it is
uncertain whether such executive agreements can be made absent an ex-
press grant of presidential power.'
It is generally accepted that executive agreements made with the
support of a majority of each House, or perhaps even simply with the
acquiescence of Congress,45 will make domestic law if the subject of the
39 See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202
(1890); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See also the discussion
in L. HENKIN, supra note 29, at chs. I, II.
40 Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319-20 (1936); see also L. HENKIN, supra note 29,
at ch. II.
41 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942). These cases held that an aspect of the Litvinov Agreement, under which the Soviet govern-
ment assigned to the United States rights based on a Soviet appropriation of bank accounts in New
York, overrode a state court doctrine of refusing to recognize foreign confiscatory law. In Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the Supreme Court held to be valid the effective Executive
Orders terminating claims in United States courts by United States nationals against Iran and nulli-
fying U.S. court judgments against Iran and attachments against Iranian property. These Executive
Orders were made to fulfill undertakings given by the Executive as part of the agreement for the
release of the American hostages in Iran. (This claim settlement was not associated with the Presi-
dent's recognition power as was the Litvinov agreement). The Court might be read as having limited
its decision solely to the effect of executive agreements when it said: "Crucial to our decision today
is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive
agreement." Id. at 680. The Court also states: "Thus, even if the pre-1952 cases should be disre-
garded, Congressional acquiescence in settlement agreements since that time supports the Presi-
dent's power to act here." Id. at 684. That passage should, however, be read in light of the fact that
the Court said that because the case had been given expedited treatment, the Court would "rest
decision on the narrowest possible ground capable of deciding the case." Id. at 660. Furthermore,
the court cited Pink several times with apparent approval. Id. at 679, 682-83.
42 One federal court of appeals has held that an executive agreement cannot override an earlier
act of Congress. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), ajf'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). That view is criticised by L. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 186 and
material cited therein.
43 The President has express power to "receive Ambassadors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. This
connection was emphasized by the Court in Pink, 315 U.S. at 226-30 and in Dames & Moore, 453
U.S. at 682-83, commenting on Pink.
44 =ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 121 (1965); RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 308 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980). The Litvinov Agreement, was associ-
ated with recognition of, and establishment of diplomatic relations with, the Soviet government.
45 It is significant to note that U.S. Congressional acquiescence in Executive action, acting as
an aid to judicial "lawmaking" concerning issues of Executive versus Legislative power, has no
parallel in the Australian system. Compare Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) with Koowarta, 39
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agreement comes within a power of the Congress or the President."
There is also support for the view that such agreements are interchangea-
ble with treaties.47 Despite the support for this view, the treaty power
has not withered away. Presidents continue to submit some agreements
to its procedures.48
Federation is, from one viewpoint, part of the arrangement of
checks and balances. Federal considerations have, however, played little
part in debate about either the scope of the treaty power or the alterna-
tives to the treaty power.49 The founders' decision to adopt the two-
thirds Senate vote rule for treaties was informed, not so much by a per-
ception of the Senate as the state's House (though this may have been a
factor)5° but, rather, by (a) a belief that the Senate could (and that the
more numerous House of Representatives could not) function as a con-
sultative chamber,"1 and (b) a desire to check the President's power to
involve the United States in international affairs. 2
Austl. L.R. at 434 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 449 (Stephen, J., concurring); id. at 459 (Mason, J.,
concurring).
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 120 (1965); see Cotzhausen v.
Nazro, 107 U.S. 215 (1882); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); B. Altman & Co. v. United States,
224 U.S. 583 (1912); United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); L. HENKIN,
supra note 29, at 174-75. The powers of the Congress include implied or inherent powers in the area
of foreign relations. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 518 (1889); Jones v. United States, 137
U.S. 202 (1890); Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
47 See McDougal & Lans, supra note 36; L. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 175; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 120 reporters' note (1965); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 307 comment b and reporters' notes 1 and 2 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980).
48 Some of the political considerations which may contribute to this pattern are discussed by R.
GHOSH, supra note 1, at 100-01; L. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 176, 183-84; see also RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 307 reporters' notes 2 and 3 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980); Oliver,
Getting the Senators to Accept the Reference of Treaties to Both Houses for Approval by Simple Major-
ities, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1980); Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 257 (1983).
49 Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements - A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616 (1945), saw a
federal objection to the use of Congressional-Executive agreements:
But what condemns to sterility the suggestion of a Congressional-Executive agreement by
which the Congress purportedly acts in approval of the President's agreements, and what
makes it a dangerous device for changing the form of the American Government, is that
majorities in Congress could thus, by the same majorities as are required for any statute,
arrogate to themselves and drain away all state power on any subject they felt disposed to
control.
Id. at 662; see also id. at 635. Even for Borchard, however, the merit of the two-thirds Senate vote
rule was not that the Senate would protect state interests, but that a two-thirds vote of one House
might be more difficult to obtain than a simple majority in each House. Id. at 659-61, 663-64.
50 McDougal & Lans, supra note 36, at 538-44, and material cited therein.
51 Id. at 539-40 and materials cited therein.
52 Id. at 544, 549 and material cited therein. See also L. HENKIN, supra note 29, who suggests
that the two-thirds rule was, consistent with the checking purpose of the treaty power, intended to
make up for the absence of the check of a majority in both Houses. Id. at 422 n.9.
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The potential for treaty-making to shift legislative competence to
the federation's center has received attention from the U.S. Supreme
Court 3 and from commentators. 4 The Supreme Court has protected
the state domain only to the extent of suggesting that a treaty must relate
to a subject matter "properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign
country" and even this suggestion is framed in terms of what is sufficient
rather than in terms of what is necessary.5 5 The view once put forward
that a treaty must relate to a matter of "international concern" is now no
longer generally accepted. 6 No treaty or other international agreement
has ever been held invalid because its subject matter was not "properly"
the subject of international negotiation or because there was no "interna-
tional concern" about its subject matter.5 7
The defense of the two thirds rule (and the case for limiting alterna-
tive forms of international agreements) is presented primarily in terms of
the "virtues" of inhibiting presidential and/or congressional action. 8
No suggestion is made that when one third plus one member of the Sen-
ate blocks a treaty that the goal is to protect some localized state interest
from national encroachment. Rather, treaties are usually opposed be-
cause of their foreign policy content.5 9 That is, the treaty blocking power
typically does not operate as a function of federalism. Rather the power
functions, as originally intended, to restrict the Executive's freedom of
action in international affairs.
The American experience of foreign affairs in constitutional law can
be summarized as a conflict between the international pressures for presi-
dential action and the domestic pressures for Senate and/or congres-
sional rights to veto decisions. The Australian experience might be
53 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); Holland, 252 U.S. at 432; see also the citations
collected by L. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 389 n.50, 391 n.62.
54 L. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 140-48 and cases cited therein.
55 Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267; see also Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924);
Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931).
56 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, 117 (1965) with RE-
STATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS § 304 comments c and d and reporters' notes 2 and 3
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980).
57 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331, where the U.S. Supreme Court made it
clear that notions of federally preserved areas of state competence would fail when state law and
policy conflicted with a sole executive agreement as the national government must of necessity be
unhindered by state law or policy when acting in the area of international affairs.
58 The arguments in favor of the two-thirds rule are brought together and criticized acerbically
by McDougal & Lans, supra note 36, at 574-82; see also Borchard. supra note 49, at 660-63.
59 McDougal & Lans, supra note 36, at 553-73; F. WILCOX supra note 29; Oliver, supra note
48; Glennon, supra note 48. See also L. HENKIN, supra note 29, who identifies occasions where the
Senate has acted to protect local interests from national encroachment. He also points out that the
House of Representatives can sometimes be more "parochial," or protective of local interests, than
the Senate. Id. at 248.
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summarized as a conflict between the international pressures for national
action, and the domestic pressures for states' rights to veto decisions.
Although the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia relied
on the U.S. model in many respects, it did not incorporate the U.S. Con-
stitution's pattern of checks and balances. While a doctrine of separation
of powers exists, it is much weaker than its U.S. ancestor. 60 The Com-
monwealth of Australia's Constitution relies on British principles of re-
sponsible government.61 The Executive is without a doubt, subordinate
to the legislature. The Ministers, who control executive power, must be
members of, and are therefore directly answerable to, Parliament. 62 Per-
haps just as important for determining the nature of the Australian pro-
visions relating to international affairs is the fact that the Commonwealth
of Australia was not intended to assume international statehood immedi-
ately upon its establishment. Rather, the Commonwealth of Australia
was to continue to be part of the British Empire.63
These two factors then-the British notion of responsible govern-
ment and the belief that Australia was not going to be confronted imme-
diately with the problems and responsibilities of international
statehood-resulted in there being no detailed provision for the conduct
of foreign relations. The lack of detail in the relevant provisions which
were inserted has allowed Australian Constitutional law to adapt to
changes in Australia's circumstances.
The Australian Constitution contains no express reference to treaty
making.' According to common law principles, treaty making is a mat-
60 For a discussion of the doctrine of separation of powers in the Australian Constitution see L.
ZINES, supra note 27, ch. 9; Lane, The Decline of the Boilermakers Separation of Powers Doctrine, 53
AUSTL. L.J. 6 (1981).
61 Moffat, Philosophical Foundations of the Australian Constitutional Tradition, 5 SYDNEY L.
REV. 59 (1965) (discusses the general influences of the British and American constitutional tradi-
tions on the Australian constitutional framework). For the British concept of responsible govern-
ment see 34 HALSBURG'S LAWS OF ENGLAND paras. 1005-1006 (4th ed. 1974), and 0. PHILLIPS,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 26-27 (5th ed. 1973).
62 AUSTL. CONST. § 64. "After the first general election no Minister of State shall hold office
for a longer period than three months unless he is or becomes a senator or a member of the House of
Representatives."
63 See generally Zines, The Growth ofAustralian Nationhood and its Effects on the Powers of the
Commonwealth, in COMMENTARIES ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION (L. Zines ed. 1977); L.
ZINES, supra note 27, at ch. 13. In the cases of China Ocean Shipping Co. v. South Australia, 145
C.L.R. 172 (1978-79) (noted at 11 FEDERAL L. REv. 229 (1980)), Southern Centre of Theosophy
Inc. v. South Australia, 145 C.L.R. 246 (1979) and Pochi v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs, 43 Austl. L.R. 261 (1982), the High Court has considered the constitutional relationship
between Australia and the United Kingdom.
64 AUSTL. CONST. § 75(i) gives the High Court original jurisdiction "In all matters: - (i)
Arising under any treaty." This provision is discussed by Thomson, supra note 9, at 127-29.
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ter of external royal prerogative.65 At one stage in drafting the Constitu-
tion, the legislative subject matter in section 51(xxix) was termed
"external affairs and treaties."66 It seems that the reference to "treaties"
was deleted, however, so as not to offend the Empire within whose inter-
national statehood the Commonwealth of Australia was to be subsumed
on its establishment.67 It is generally accepted that the Crown in right of
the Commonwealth now represents Australia internationally68 and that
the prerogative power to make treaties binding Australia internationally
has become part of the general executive power of the Crown in right of
the Commonwealth of Australia.69
The nature of the power of the Commonwealth Executive in relation
to treaties must be emphasized. The Commonwealth Executive can bind
Australia internationally to a treaty on any subject matter and is not
limited to treaties on subject matters corresponding to Commonwealth
legislative powers.7" Furthermore, the Commonwealth Executive can so
bind Australia without involving either House of Parliament.71 In ac-
cordance with common law principles, however, the fact that the Com-
monwealth Executive has bound Australia to an international treaty,
does not of itself affect domestic law within Australia. 72 Ordinarily, im-
plementing legislation is required.73
Any of the Commonwealth's legislative powers might be relied on to
65 See generally, supra note 31 and accompanying text; L. ZINES, supra note 27, at 202-07
(1981); Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 838-40 (1983).
66 J. LA NAUZE, THE MAKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTrTUION 51-52 (1972).
67 Thomson, supra note 9, at 123-27 discusses the historical evidence for this explanation of the
change. See also J. LA NAUZE, supra note 66, at 172, 184, 252.
68 See The Queen v. Burgess; Exparte Henry, 55 C.L.R. 608, 643-44 (1936) (Latham, C.J.); id.
at 681-86 (Evatt and McTiernan, JJ., concurring); Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. 434 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin
and Wilson, JJ., concurring); id. at 449 (Stephen, J., concurring); id. at 458 (Mason J.); id. at 469-70
(Murphy, J.); id. at 479 (Wilson, J.); id. at 482-83 (Brennan, J.). In the Tasmanian Dam Case, 46
Austl. L.R. 838-40 842, Justice Dawson, while acknowledging that the Crown in right of the Com-
monwealth can bind Australia internationally to a treaty on any subject matter, expressed his doubts
as to whether section 61 is the source of this power. See generally Zines, The Growth ofAustralian
Nationhood and its Effect on the Powers of the Commonwealth & Richardson, The Executive Power of
the Commonwealth, in COMMENTARIES ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 63, at 1,
50.
69 AuSTL. CONST. § 61 provides: "The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the
Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and extends to the
execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth."
70 See The Queen v. Burgess; Exparte Henry, 55 C.L.R. 608 (1936); id. at 639 (Latham, C.J.);
idl at 682 (Evatt and MeTiernan, JJ.); Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 434 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 450
(Stephen, J.); id. at 463 (Mason, J.); id. at 470 (Murphy, J.); id. at 479 (Wilson, J.).
71 See supra notes 30 and 64 and accompanying text.
72 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 434 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 449 (Stephen, J., concurring); id. at 459
(Mason, J., concurring), and cases cited therein.
73 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 434 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 449 (Stephen, J., concurring); id. at 459
(Mason, J., concurring), and cases cited therein.
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implement a treaty if the treaty's subject matter corresponds to the sub-
ject matter of the head of power. The power in section 51 (xxix) to make
laws with respect to "external affairs" is a power which might be invoked
not because of the subject matter of the treaty, but because the treaty is
an international agreement. The legislative subject in section 51 (xxix) is
described tersely as "external affairs."
A. A Power to Make Laws With Respect to "External Affairs"
The potential of section 51 (xxix) to affect the distribution of legisla-
tive competence within Australia has long been recognized.v4 Whatever
else might be included within the subject matter,7" "external affairs" in-
cludes Australia's relation with other countries.76 The negotiation and
engagement in treaties by Australia's international representative, the
Commonwealth Executive, is clearly part of Australia's relations with
other countries. A law controlling the Commonwealth Executive in such
activities would be consistent with the British perception of the relation-
ship between the Executive and Parliament.7 Such a law is clearly
within Parliament's power under section 5 1(xxix) and/or section 51 (xx-
xix) in section 51(xxxix)'s operation in relation to matters incidental to
exercises of Executive power.7 8 The controversy begins when Parliament
legislates to control the activities within Australia of persons who are not
international states or their representatives.
The contexts in which the issues of section 51 (xxix) were raised and
considered in Koowarta and in the Tasmanian Dam Case each repre-
sented a direct conflict between Commonwealth and state wills. In
Koowarta, the following facts were assumed for the purposes of argument
74 Moore, The Commonwealth of Australia Bill, 16 L.Q. REv. 35, 39 (1900).
75 See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
76 Of the nine Justices involved in the Koowarta and Tasmanian Dam Case decisions, only
Justice Dawson did not expressly accept this proposition, although he came close to doing so. Tas-
manian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 839-40 (1983). For clear acceptance by the other Justices see
Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 430-31 (Gibbs, C.J., with Aickin and Wilson, JJ. concurring); id at 449
(Stephen, J.); id. at 458 (Mason, J.); id. at 469 (Murphy, J.); id. at 486 (Brennan, J.); Tasmanian
Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 805 (Deane, J.). It must be noted that the clause speaks of external
rather than foreign affairs so as to include relations with countries within the Empire which, at the
time of the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia, owed allegiance to the same sovereign
and were therefore not "foreign." The Queen v. Burgess, 55 C.L.R. 608, 684 (Evatt and McTiernan,
JJ.). British subjects are now, however, foreigners in Australia. Pochi v. Minister for Immigration
and Ethnic Affairs, 43 Austl. L.R. 261 (1982). Justice Mason has offered the alternative, not incom-
patible explanation, that the word "foreign" would have been inappropriate at the establishment of
Australia, as Australia at that stage lacked international status and would therefore have been inca-
pable of having "foreign" affairs. Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 458.
77 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
78 See Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 839-40 (Dawson, J.); compare Koowarta, 39
Austl. L.R. at 459 (Mason, J.); id. at 470 (Murphy, J.) ("Otherwise the executive power in relation to
external affairs, unless confined by Parliament, is unconfined.") (Emphasis added).
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on demurrer: A corporation which had been established under Com-
monwealth law to aid in the advancement of Aborigines had made ar-
rangements to purchase, from its current holder, a lease of Crown land
being used for pastoral purposes. It was proposed that the land be devel-
oped for pastoral purposes by a group of Aborigines." The Crown from
which the land was leased was the Crown in right of the State of Queen-
sland. Queensland statute law provided that a Crown lease could not be
transferred without the state Minister's consent. The Minister refused to
give his consent.80 The state government announced that it was opposed
to the transfer because it thought there was enough land in Aboriginal
hands and because it was opposed to any more land being developed by
Aboriginal groups in isolation. 81 Koowarta, one of the Aborigines who
was going to work the land, sought injunctive and declaratory remedies
under the Commonwealth's Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 which,
inter alia, purported to implement the International Convention for the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by prohibiting dis-
crimination on account of race in land dealings. 82 The High Court, by a
vote of four (Justices Stephen, Mason, Murphy and Brennan) to three
(Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Aickin and Wilson), held that the rele-
vant provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act of 197583 were sup-
ported by section 51(xxix). By the time the Tasmanian Dam Case was
argued, Justices Stephen and Aickin had been replaced by Justices Deane
and Dawson.84
The Tasmanian Dam Case involved a proposal to build a hydro-
electric dam in the southwest region of the State of Tasmania. The pro-
posed dam would have flooded portions of two rivers, the Gordon and
the Franklin, which flow through wilderness in a high rainfall area. 85
The area contains spectacular scenery, unusual flora and archaeological
sites from human habitation in the region more than 20,000 years ago.86
The dam proposal had been an important issue in both Federal and Tas-
79 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 419-21.
80 Id. at 420.
81 Id.
82 A parallel debate in the United States about the possibility that international treaties may
create human rights enforceable as part of the domestic law of the United States has lost some of its
urgency with the expansion, through judicial interpretation, of the Bill of Rights. R. LILLICH & F.
NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS 96-97 (1979); Oliver, The Treaty Power and National
Foreign Policy as Vehicles for the Enforcement of Human Rights in the United States, 9 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 411 (1981). For a recent article suggesting that sources external to the Constitution be used to
add substantive content to the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution in
ways that prevent conflict with international law, see Christensen, Using Human Rights Law to
Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analysis, 52 U. CN. L. REv. 3 (1983).
83 §§ 9, 12, 24.
84 See supra note 6.
85 46 Austl. L.IL at 633-34.
86 Id. at 637-38.
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manian elections. Eventually at the state level both the Liberal govern-
ment and the opposition Australian Labor Party supported the building
of a dam while at the Federal level not only the contenders for govern-
ment-the Liberal/National Country Party coalition and the Australian
Labor Party-but also the Australian Democrats, with potential to con-
trol the Senate, were opposed to a dam in the area. 7 Until early 1983 the
Federal government was in the hands of the Liberal/National Country
Party coalition under Prime Minister Fraser. This government consid-
ered it inappropriate to do anything more than to offer inducements to
the Tasmanian government not to build the dam."8
A Labor government under Prime Minister Hawke was returned
early in 1983 and promulgated regulations under an existing Common-
wealth Act-the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act of
1975.89 With the support of the Australian Democrats in the Senate, the
Labor government secured the enactment of a new Act (the World Heri-
tage Properties Conservation Act of 1983)90 which was designed to pre-
vent, inter alia, dam construction in the Gordon/Franklin region. The
legislation purported to be, inter alia, an implementation of Australia's
obligations under the Convention for the Protection of the World Cul-
tural and Natural Heritage.91 In 1981, the Tasmanian (then Labor) Gov-
ernment had requested the Federal (then Liberal/National Country
Party) Government to apply for World Heritage listing for the Gordon
and Franklin rivers.9' The Federal Government made that application
and refused to withdraw it when requested to do so by the Tasmanian
Government (Liberal at that stage).93 The World Heritage Committee
had listed the area late in 1982.9' When the validity of the New Federal
Labor Government's action was tested before the High Court, enough of
it was upheld (by the vote of Justices Mason, Murphy, Brennan and De-
ane over the dissents of Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Wilson and
87 97 AUSTL. PARL. DEB., SENATE (Hansard) 3240-70 (1982), sets out the views of the major
parties shortly before the 1983 federal election. The development of the views of the major parties is
set out in Bates, The Aftermath of Lake Pedder, in THE SOUTH WEST DAM DispUTE: THE LEGAL
AND POLITICAL IssuEs 2-5 (M. Sornarajah ed. 1983); P. THOMPSON, BOB BROWN OF THE FRANK-
LIN RIVER 113-80 (1984) (Bob Brown was the leader of the campaign against the damming of the
Franklin).
88 See 97 AusTL. PARL. DEB., supra note 87, at 3241, 3248; Bates, supra note 87, at 4; P.
THOMPSON, supra note 87, at 171-72.
89 12 AUSTL. ACTS P. 101 (1975).
90 65 AUSTL. ACTS P. (1983).
91 The Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage was
adopted and ratified by Australia on Aug. 22, 1974. Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 651
(Gibbs, C.J.).





Dawson) for the dam construction to be stopped.9"
It was against these highly charged backgrounds-race relations in
Koowarta and conservation versus economic development in the Tasma-
nian Dam Case-that the content of section 51(xxix) was considered.
The consideration of the content of section 5 1(xxix) revolved around the
following three main issues:
1. Whether the potential of section 51(xxix) need be constrained so
as to preserve a "federal" distribution of legislative competence?
2. What will suffice to bring a subject matter within the reach of
section 5 l(xxix)?
3. Is it sufficient to bring a subject matter within the reach of sec-
tion 5 l(xxix) that the Commonwealth Executive has made Australia sub-
ject to international treaty obligations relating to that subject matter?
The first two issues interlock and logically precede the third. The
reader should, at this point, be warned that, in accordance with the High
Court tradition of judicial independence, eight of the nine judges in-
volved in these cases wrote a full judgment in each case in which he was
involved. Thirteen separate sets of reasoning and many differences in
approach were the result.
1. Need the Potential of section 51(xxix) be Constrained so as to
Preserve a Federal Distribution of Legislative Competence?
The Chief Justice, Sir Harry Gibbs answered emphatically and
unambiguously yes-the federal nature of the Constitution did have to be
taken into account.96 In this conclusion, and the reasoning behind it, he
received the support of Justices Aickin and Wilson in Koowarta97 and of
Justices Wilson and Dawson in the Tasmanian Dam Case.98 The basic
point was simple: whatever the words "external affairs" might mean at
first sight, it could not have been the intention of the Constitution that
any one of the Commonwealth's powers in section 51 should render oti-
ose the other powers in the list.9 9 This basic point was embellished by
95 Most of the facts are set out in the judgment of Chief Justice Gibbs, 46 Austl. L.R. at 633-
39.
96 Koowarta, 39 Aust. L.R. at 438-45; Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 668-69.
97 In Koowarta, both Justices expressed full agreement with the judgment of the Chief Justice.
39 Austl. L.R. at 475. Justice Wilson also made some supplementary remarks of his own at 475-82.
In particular Justice Wilson found encouragement in the "repeated references in the United States
Supreme Court to the operation of constitutional implications to restrain Congressional power." Id.
at 481-82. This aspect of Justice Wilson's judgment is considered further infra at notes 239-40 and
accompanying text.
98 46 Austl. L.R. at 752, 841-43, respectively.
99 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 438-39 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, JJ. concurring); Tas-
manian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 669 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 752 (Wilson, J.); id. at 842-43 (Daw-
son, J., referring to the judgment of Chief Justice Gibbs in Koowarta).
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the proposition that Australia was intended to be a "true" federation."°
It was unthinkable that the Commonwealth Executive should be able, by
its own actions in the sphere of external affairs, to increase the scope of
Commonwealth legislative powers. 10
The response of Justice Stephen in Koowarta was ambiguous. He
neither expressly accepted or rejected the proposition that the federal na-
ture of the Constitution could be taken into account when considering
section 5 1(xxix).1 °2 However, it might be inferred that his Honour was
accepting that the federal nature of the Constitution could be taken into
account because he eventually adopted a formula"0 3 similar to one which
he had earlier described as being designed to take account of the federal
nature of the Constitution. 4
Justices Mason, Murphy and Brennan in Koowarta10 5 and in the
Tasmanian Dam Case,1" 6 and Justice Deane in the Tasmanian Dam
Case,107 all answered unambiguously that the federal nature of the Con-
stitution could not be allowed to limit the natural meaning of "external
affairs." The grant of power with respect to "external affairs" was itself
part of the federal structure of the Constitution, and a part of the defini-
tion of Commonwealth legislative competence. 08 While the founders
may well not have foreseen the growth in external affairs that has taken
place this century, that in itself was no reason for narrowing the meaning
of the grant of power. If anything, the inclination should be to give con-
stitutional grants of legislative power a broad construction. 109
100 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 439 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, JJ. concurring). Refer-
ence was made to the discussion of the incidental area of the commerce power in Airlines of New
South Wales, 113 C.L.R. 54 (1964), discussed supra note 20 and accompanying text.
101 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 438-40 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, JJ., concurring). Tas-
manian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 669 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 843 (Dawson, J., referring to the
judgment of Chief Justice Gibbs in Koowarta).
102 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 445-57 (Stephen, J.).
103 Id. at 453. "Nevertheless the quality of being of international concern remains, no less than
ever, a valid criterion of whether a particular subject matter forms part of a nation's 'external af-
fairs'." Id.
104 Id. at 450. "The real issue in these cases is confined to the question whether this power to
implement treaty obligations is subject to any and if so what overriding qualifications derived from
the federal nature of our Constitution. It is such qualifications which, in my statement of a highest
common factor, have led to the introduction of the phrases 'matters international in character and
'legitimately the subject of agreement between nations'." Note his Honour's reference to L. HEN-
KIN, supra note 29, at 140-41. Id. at 452.
105 39 Austl. L.R. at 461-62, 472, 484 respectively.
106 46 Austl. L.R. at 692-94, 726-28, 772-74, respectively.
107 Id. at 801-02.
108 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 462 (Mason, J.). In the Tasmanian Dam Case Justice Murphy
said "no rational argument is advanced for disregarding the particular federal power relied upon
when achieving the [federal] balance." 46 Austl. L.R. at 727. See aso the opinion of Judge Deane,
id. at 802.
109 See supra tent accompanying notes 105, 106-07.
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Has the majority vote in the Tasmanian Dam Case of these four
Justices (Mason, Murphy, Brennan, and Deane) settled the issue that the
content of section 5 1(xxix) is not to be constrained by federal considera-
tions?... That is most unlikely given that four judges in Koowarta (a
majority on this sub-issue but not on the outcome of the case)-Chief
Justice Gibbs, Justices Aickin and Wilson clearly, and Justice Stephen by
inference-accepted the propriety of limiting section 5 1(xxix) to take ac-
count of the federal nature of the Constitution."' In any case, given the
looseness and generality of the issues of federalism, it is a relatively sim-
ple matter to rework a federal argument so as to distinguish the new
version from the "discredited" federal argument. 112 Furthermore, as the
ensuing discussion will demonstrate, some specific propositions which
limit the use of the external affairs power seem to have taken on a sepa-
rate existence of their own (although originally federally based).
2. What Will Bring a Subject Matter Within the Reach of Section
5 1(xxix)?
Capacity to affect Australia's international relations is the core of
the characterization problem. However, just as with the commerce
power's application to local activities, 1 3 the determining question is
what kind of chain of cause and possible effect is sufficient. It is not a
prerequisite for legislation under section 5 l(xxix) that there be a relevant
treaty. 1 4  It is accepted, for example, that a law prohibiting persons
110 The application of stare decisis to constitutional issues is discussed in Queensland v. the
Commonwealth (The Second Territories Representation Case), 129 C.L.IL 585 (1977). In that case
Justice Gibbs (as he then was) was adamant that a change in the membership of the High Court was
not of itself sufficient to justify review of a recent High Court decision even though he had been in
dissent in that recent decision (Western Australia v. the Commonwealth (The First Territories Repre-
sentation Case), 134 C.L.RL 201 (1975)). 129 C.L.R. at 599-600.
111 39 Austl. L.R. at 438-40 (Gibbs, C.J., and Aicken, J., concurring); id. at 479-82 (Wilson,
J.); ia at 450-52 (Stephens, J.).
112 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. (The Engineer's Case), 28
C.L.R. 129 (1920) was thought to have exploded both the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity
(which implied from the federal nature of the Constitution some immunity for the Commonwealth
and the states from each other's actions) and the doctrine of reserved powers (which construed
Commonwealth legislative powers on the assumption that specific subject matters had been reserved
to the states). See L. ZINES, supra note 27, at Ch. 14, and infra notes 232-44 and accompanying text
for the revival of a doctrine of implied intergovernmental immunity. The dissenting judges in both
Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 438-39 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, JJ., concurring) and the Tas-
manian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.RL at 669 (Gibbs, C.J.), id at 752 (Wilson, J.), id. at 841 (Dawson,
J.), considered that their approach of construing Commonwealth legislative powers in accordance
with the federalism principle that there be some unspecified subject matters beyond Commonwealth
legislative power was consistent with the Engineer's Case explosion of the reserved powers doctrine.
113 See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
114 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 449, 456 (Stephen, J.); id. at 458, 466 (Mason, J.); id. at 486
(Brennan, J.). Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 667 (Gibbs, C.J.); id at 728 (Murphy, J.); id.
at 772 (Brennan, J.); id at 805 (Deane, J.); iad at 840 (Dawson, J.). A portion of Justice Mason's
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within Australia from exciting disaffection against foreign governments is
per se within section 51(xxix). 115 Similarly, a law relating to the treat-
ment of diplomats within Australia would be within the external affairs
power with or without a relevant treaty.' 1 6
Both Koowarta and the Tasmanian Dam Case, however, involved
relevant treaties and it was not therefore necessary for the majority
judges upholding the legislation (prohibiting racial discrimination in one
case and protecting cultural and natural heritage in the other) to decide
whether the legislation would have been within power if there had not
been relevant treaties.
Even though it was not necessary to go further, Justice Mason (in-
ferentially) and Justice Murphy (directly) in Koowarta indicated that ra-
cial discrimination within Australia would have been sufficiently relevant
to Australia's international relations to be within power even without a
treaty.1 17 Justice Mason spoke of the threat that racial discrimination
provides to peaceful and friendly relations among nations. 118  Justice
Murphy pointed out how the existence of racial discrimination within
Australia devalues any criticism which Australia levels at racial discrimi-
nation or other human rights violations in other countries.119
In the Tasmanian Dam Case only Justice Murphy expressed the
opinion that section 51(xxix) would support legislation protecting world
heritage in the absence of a treaty.1 20 It seems that his Honour is willing
to accept as sufficient to establish power a tenuous connection between
local activity and Australia's international relations. His Honour said:
The preservation of the world's heritage must not be looked at in isola-
tion but as part of the co-operation betweei nations which is calculated
to achieve intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind and to rein-
opinion in the Tasmanian Dam Case might be construed as saying that the entering into of a treaty
might reduce the extent to which the subject matter could be dealt with under the external affairs
power. Id. at 697. This is, to say the least, a surprising proposition. See infra text accompanying
notes 220-25.
115 See The Queen v. Sharkey, 79 C.L.R. 121 (1949) where a law prohibiting the doing of
certain acts with intention to excite disaffection against the Government or Constitution of any of
the King's Dominions was upheld under the external affairs power. See also Koowarta, 39 Austl.
L.R. at 432 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, JJ., concurring); id. at 466 (Mason, J.).
116 Cf Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 432 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, JJ., concurring);
Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 840 (Dawson, J.). There is an act relating to crimes against
Diplomats (Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act, 1976, 8 AusTL. ACTS P. 21 (1977))
implementing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons.
117 39 Austl. L.R. at 466-67 (Mason, J.); id. at 473 (Murphy, J.).
118 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 467-68.
119 Id. at 471, 473.
120 Apparently the Commonwealth had not even submitted that the subject matter would be
within the reach of the external affairs power in the absence of a treaty. 46 Austl. L.R. at 742
(Brennan, J.); id. at 807 (Deane, J.).
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force the bonds between people which promote peace and displace
those of narrow nationalism and alienation which promote war.
Justice Murphy also offered these obiter comments:
It is preferable that the circumstances in which a law is authorized by
the external affairs power be stated in terms of what is sufficient, even
if the categories overlap, rather than in exhaustive terms. To be a law
with respect to external affairs it is sufficient that it: -
(a) Implements any international law; 122 or
(b) implements any treaty or convention whether general (multilat-
eral) or particular, or
(c) implements any recommendation or request of the United Nations
organization or subsidiary organizations such as the World Health Or-
ganization, The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization, The Food and Agriculture Organization, or the
International Labour Organization; 12 3 or
(d) fosters (or inhibits) relations between Australia or political entities,
bodies or persons within Australia and other nation States, entities,
groups or persons external to Australia; 12 4 or
(e) deals with circumstances or things outside Australia;125 or
(f) deals with circumstances or things inside Australia of international
concern. 
126
While this list contains much that is highly contentious, all of the items
can quite easily be referred to a power to make laws with respect to exter-
nal affairs, so long as federal considerations of maintaining areas of ac-
tion for the states are excluded.
Other majority judges-Justices Stephen and Brennan in
Koowarta,127 and Justices Mason, Brennan and Deane in the Tasmanian
121 Id. at 733.
122 There is nothing particularly surprising about the proposition that section 51(xx) may sup-
port legislation implementing customary international law, as the rationale supporting treaty imple-
mentation (see infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text) applies with equal force to customary
international law implementation. L.R. Zmms, supra note 27, at 230 (quoted with approval by Jus-
tice Mason in Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 466). Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Stephen also tended
to treat implementation of customary international law as being analogous to implementation of
treaty based international law. Iad at 442-44, 456 respectively.
123 This point is tied up with the question of what is a sufficient international obligation to
found power. See infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
124 It is common ground that the subject matter "external affairs" includes Australia's rela-
tions with other countries. See supra note 76. The reference to relations with other kinds of entities
is radical.
125 This view had been taken previously in New South Wales v. Commonwealth (The Seas and
Submerged Lands Case), 135 C.L.R. 337 (1975) (Barwick, C.J.); id. at 471 (Mason, J.); id. at 497
(Jacobs, J.); see also Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 458 (Mason, J.). Chief Justice Gibbs has, however,
expressed some doubt about this proposition. Id. at 430-32.
126 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 729-30.
127 39 Austl. L.R. at 456-57 (Stephens, J.); id. at 488-89, 494-95 (Brennan, J.).
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Dam Case 128-were reluctant to go further than was necessary to decide
the cases which were before them and which involved treaties. Their
judgments were, however, compatible with an open-ended approach to
the power. The proposition that international concern about a subject
matter will suffice to bring the subject matter within the reach of section
51(xxix) (even without there being a treaty thereon) has been accepted
not only by Justice Murphy 129 but also by Justices Mason 130 and
Brennan. 131
In accordance with his forcefully expressed belief that federal con-
siderations required section 51(xxix) to be limited, Chief Justice Gibbs,
with the support of Justices Aickin and Wilson, set out in Koowarta a
formula which would close off the power:
Any subject matter may constitute an external affair, provided that the
manner in which it is treated [by legislation seeking to rely on section
5 1(xxix)] in some way involves a relationship with other countries or
with persons or things outside Australia. A law which regulates trans-
actions between Australia and other countries, or between residents of
Australia and residents of other countries, would be a law with respect
to external affairs, whatever its subject matter.1 32
This seems to say connection of a law controlling activities within Aus-
tralia can only be made out if the law bears on its face an external aspect.
Without such a connection appearing on the face of the law, the law
controlling local activities cannot be upheld under section 51(xxix) no
matter what effect on Australia's international relations those local activ-
ities may in fact be having. The provisions at issue dealing with racial
discrimination, "an act done within Australia by one Australian to or in
relation to another and taking effect only within Australia," 33 did not
pass this facial test.1 3 1
Neither the outcome of the Koowarta or the Tasmanian Dam Case,
both of which involved treaties, prevent this restricting formula from be-
128 46 Austl. L.R. at 707-09 (Mason, J.); id. at 762, 790 (Brennan, J.); id. at 814-16 (Deane, J.).
129 See paragraph (f) in the quote set out supra text accompanying note 126 and Koowarta, 39
Austl. L.R. at 473.
130 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 466-67; Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 697.
131 Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 772.
132 39 Austl. L.R. at 441. Justices Aickin and Wilson agreed generally with the judgment of
Chief Justice Gibbs. Id. at 475. For Justice Wilson's additional comments see id. at 477. Chief
Justice Gibbs, id. at 432-33, and Justice Wilson, id. at 477, both argued that all the laws previously
held to be within section 51(xxix) exhibited this characteristic. It is not particularly clear to this
writer, however, why their Honours considered that legislation controlling air navigation over Aus-
tralia by Australians passed this test. Id. at 431-33, 476-77, respectively, referring to The Queen v.
Burgess Ex parte Henry, 55 C.L.R. 608 (1936), The Queen v. Poole, Ex parte Henry (No. 2), 61
C.L.R. 634 (1939) and Airlines of New South Wales [No. 2], 113 C.L.R. 54 (1965).
133 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R., at 429-30 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, J.J., concurring).
134 Id. at 442.
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ing used in situations where the Commonwealth seeks to legislate without
any relevant treaty. The test has the advantage of greatly simplifying the
inquiry into validity. It is to be noted, however, that this test has no
justification other than the necessity perceived by some, and vigorously
denied by others, of restricting Commonwealth power. In its severity the
test is without parallel in doctrines relating to other Commonwealth leg-
islative powers. Even with the incidental aspect of the commerce power,
where the Court has chosen to ignore certain kinds of effects of local
activities on the subject matter of power,135 the Court still allows some
control of local activities (unsafe intrastate air navigation) even though
no connection with the subject matter of power (interstate and overseas
commerce) appears in the operative provisions of the legislation. 36
There the Court takes account of the effect that the local activity could
have on the subject matter of power. It is arguable that the test adopted
by Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Aickin and Wilson in Koowarta de-
nies that anything at all is incidental to the subject matter of section
5 1 (xxix). 1
3 7
3. What Effect Does It Have on the Scope of Section 5 1(xxix) for
the Commonwealth Executive to Incur International Treaty Obligations?
For those who feel no need to limit section 51 (xxix) on account of its
federal context, it is not at all difficult to connect legislation fulfilling
Australia's treaty obligations with Australia's international relations.
There are a range of ways in which that connection can be explained. If
the Australian Executive incurs, on Australia's behalf, treaty obligations
135 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
136 Airlines of New South Wales [No. 2] 113 C.L.R. 54 (1965).
137 The question of where the center of the "external affairs" power ends and the incidental
aspect comes into play has not been directly discussed by members of the Court. The dissenting
judges have, however, emphasized the difference between activities related to carrying on Australia's
international relations and activities within Australia which are not themselves Australia's relations
with other countries but which the Commonwealth may wish to control because those activities are
having or could have an effect on Australia's international relations. See Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at
440 where Chief Justice Gibbs (with the concurrence of Justices Aickin and Wilson) comments on
the submission of Sir Daryl Dawson, then Solicitor-General for the state of Victoria. As a Justice of
the High Court, Dawson later developed this principle in the Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R.
at 839-40. Such an approach tends to treat control of activities which are not themselves interna-
tional relations but which may affect international relations, as an issue of incidental power.
Rather than focus on the incidental power, the majority judges have tended to speak of activi-
ties within Australia becoming "external affairs." See, eg., Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 473 (Mur-
phy, J.); id. at 487 (Brennan, J.). Such language tends to implicate the center of the external affairs
power. The choice of language is not merely semantic because an initial decision that the activity
being controlled is not itself within the center of the subject matter of the power, and therefore can
only be reached, if at all, by recourse to the incidental power makes arguments for limiting the power
to maintain a federal balance, albeit still of debatable worth, more respectable. Cf. Gazzo v. Comp-
troller of Stamps, 38 Austl. L.R. 25 (1981).
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in relation to a subject matter, then that subject matter is taken into ex-
ternal affairs. Treaties are a formalization of a part of Australia's inter-
national relations. A treaty is evidence of the existence of international
concern about the subject matter of the treaty. Failure to fulfill treaty
obligations tends to invite international protest about that particular fail-
ure and deprives Australia of credibility when carrying on other interna-
tional relations. Based upon similar reasoning, Justices Mason, Murphy
and Brennan in Koowarta38 and the Tasmanian Dam Case139 and Justice
Deane in the Tasmanian Dam Case"4 clearly accepted the proposition
that if the Commonwealth Executive has incurred an international treaty
obligation, then a correlative power for the Commonwealth parliament is
generated to legislate under section 5 1(xxix) to implement the obligation.
Justices Stephen,14 ' Mason,' 42 Brennan 43 and Deane' 44 have indi-
cated that if a treaty is arranged and entered into by the Commonwealth
Executive solely as a device for attracting legislative power then legisla-
tive power will not or may not be attracted. Justice Brennan offered the
fullest explanation of why this should be so. His Honour said: "Such a
colourable attempt to convert a matter of internal concern into an exter-
nal affair would fail because the subject of the treaty obligation would not
in truth affect or be likely to affect Australia's relations with other
nations." 145
If all the parties to a treaty were aware that it was a sham contrived
merely to generate legislative power for the Commonwealth of Australia,
then it might be understandable that the treaty would be deprived of any
force as evidence of either the international concern of the parties or the
likelihood that failure to implement the treaty would provoke interna-
tional reaction. If, however, some or all of the other parties were una-
ware of the lack of bona fides of the Commonwealth Executive, then the
treaty and the fact that Australia was apparently bound thereby, would
still seem to establish the relevance of the subject matter of the treaty to
Australia's international relations. The difficulties of establishing a lack
of bona fides by the Commonwealth Executive would be large enough. 146
138 39 Austl. L.R. at 459, 463-64, 467 (Mason, J.); id. at 473 (Murphy, J.); id. at 486-87 (Bren-
nan, J.).
139 46 Austl. L.R. at 691 (Mason, J); id. at 728-29 (Murphy, J.); id. at 771-72 (Brennan, J.).
140 Id. at 803-804.
141 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 452-53.
142 Id. at 459, 464. But see his Honour's statements in the Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl.
L.R. at 692, set out infra text accompanying note 146.
143 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 487-88; Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 771.
144 Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 805.
145 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 488.
146 See generally Sankey v. Whitlam, 142 C.L.R. 1 (1978); Re Toohey; Ex parte Northern
Land Council, 38 Austl. L.R. 439 (1981); L. ZINES, supra note 27, at 177-87, 227. Justice Brennan
seems willing to test bona fides indirectly by examining objective indicia such as the treaty's subject
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The difficulties of testing the bona fides of other parties to a treaty would
be enormous.1 47
It is not likely, however, that the Commonwealth Executive would
arrange many sham treaties. Too many bona fide treaties exist for the
Commonwealth Executive to need to arrange shams. In Koowarta, Jus-
tice Wilson commented:
In addition to the Covenant on Racial Discrimination, there is now the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, in addition to the Covenants of the
International Labour Organization. There are Declarations on the
rights of the child, the rights of mentally retarded persons, and the
rights of disabled persons. It is no exaggeration to say that what is
emerging is a sophisticated network of international arrangements di-
rected to the personal, economic, social and cultural development of
all human beings. The effect of investing the Parliament with power
through section 51(xxix) in all these areas would be to transfer to the
Commonwealth virtually unlimited power in almost every conceivable
aspect of life in Australia, including health and hospitals, the work-
place, law and order, the economy, education, and recreational and
cultural activity, to mention but a few general heads. 148
For Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Aickin, Wilson and Dawson, it
was unthinkable that the Commonwealth Executive, by incurring treaty
obligations, should be able to effect such a shift in legislative compe-
tence. 149 In Koowarta, Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Aickin and Wil-
son were of the opinion that the Commonwealth Parliament could only
legislate under section 5 1(xxix) to implement an international treaty obli-
gation if the subject matter would have been within the reach of section
51(xxix) without the treaty.150 Such a restrictive view of the effect of a
treaty had not been adopted previously by any member of the High
Court.1 5 ' Again, no positive reasoning, beyond the perceived necessity of
matter, manner of formation and extent of international participation and the nature of obligations
created by the treaty. Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 488; Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 771.
147 The act of state doctrine might not operate to prevent an examination of the bona fides of
foreign states as that doctrine is concerned with preventing courts from adjudicating on the lawful-
ness or rightness of the foreign sovereign's act of state. See Nissan v. Attorney-General [1970] A.C.
179, 237 (Lord Pearson). For purposes of the external affairs power the issue is not whether the
foreign sovereign acted lawfully or rightly in becoming party to a treaty, but whether there is, in fact,
international concern about the subject matter of the treaty.
148 39 Austl. L.R. at 481.
149 Id. at 438-40 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, JJ., concurring); Tasmanian Dam Case, 46
Austl. L.R. at 669 (Gibbs, CJ.); 840-42 (Dawson J., concurring).
150 39 Aust. L.R. at 440 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, JJ., concurring); id. at 481 (Wilson,
J.).
151 Chief Justice Gibbs believed his approach was the same used by Justice Dixon in The
Queen v. Burgess; Ex parte Henry, 55 C.L.R. 608, 669 (1936). 39 Aust. L.R. at 440. In Burgess,
Justice Dixon had said that the Commonwealth could legislate to implement a treaty the subject
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restricting Commonwealth power, was advanced to support this ap-
proach." 2 Their Honours pointed out that it was not unusual for federal
systems to have a division of competence to implement international
treaty obligations'53 and that inability of the Commonwealth Parliament
to fulfill Australia's international obligations would not deprive Australia
of international statehood.154 In their view, Australia would have com-
petence to fulfill treaty obligations divided between the Commonwealth
and the states.15 5 As it had done on previous occasions, the Common-
wealth could request the states to enact implementing legislation.' 56
In making these points their Honours had to some extent answered
the broader language of Justices Mason and Murphy, who had described
the possibility of the Commonwealth Parliament being without power to
implement international relations as equivalent to Australia being an in-
ternational cripple unable to carry on international relations.'5 7 What
the narrow view judges failed to explain, however, was why only argu-
ments alleging a threat to Australia's international sovereignty deserved
an answer; the central consideration would seem to be relevance to Aus-
tralia's international relations. Their approach treated Australia's inter-
national treaty obligations as irrelevant to Australia's international
relations. To state it so indicates just how determined these judges were
matter of which was "indisputably international in character." 55 C.L.R. at 669. One should note,
however, that although Justice Dixon regarded as "extreme" the view that a treaty could bring any
subject matter within the external affairs power, his Honour did not say that it was necessary, merely
that it was sufficient, that the subject matter of a treaty be indisputably international. Id.
152 See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
153 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 434 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, JJ., concurring). Com-
pare the opinions of Stephen, J. at 451-53 and Brennan, J., at 483. Justice Wilson drew particular
attention to the Canadian experience and to the Privy Council decision in Attorney General for
Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326, holding that the Dominion and Provin-
cial legislature together had sufficient power to implement treaties. 39 Austl. L.R. at 480. His Hon-
our noted one commentator's opinion (McWhinney, Canadian Federalism, and the foreign Affairs
and Treaty Power, 7 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3, 4-5 (1969)) that the Privy
Council decision had not even caused mild inconvenience let alone practical difficulties. Justice
Wilson did not, however, refer to the doubts expressed by the Canadian Supreme Court in Francis v.
The Queen [1956] S.C.R. 618, 621, The Offshore Mineral Rights Case [1967] S.C.R. 792, 815-17,
and by other commentators. See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 97 (1977); Milani,
The Canadian Treaty Power: Decidedly Anachronistic; Potentially Antagonistic, 44 SAsK. L. REv 195
(1980); McDonald, The Problem of Treaty-Making and Treaty Implementation in Canada, 19 AL-
BERTA L. REV. 293 (1981); Scott, Labour Conventions Case: Lord Wright's Undisclosed Dissent, 34
CAN. BAR REV. 114, 115 (1956) for discussions of the standing of the Privy Council decision.
154 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 483.
155 39 Austl. L.R. at 434-35 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, JJ., concurring); id. at 479-80
(Wilson, J.).
156 Id. at 445 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, JJ., concurring); id. at 480 (Wilson, J.). Justice
Wilson referred to Burmester, The Australian States and Participation in the Foreign Policy Process, 9
FEDERAL L. REv. 257 (1978). 39 Austl. L.R. at 480. The same Burmester campaigned to prevent
dam construction in South West Tasmania.
157 See Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 459-60, 462-63 (Mason, J.); id. at 473 (Murphy, J.).
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to protect their perception of the true federation. To say that the Com-
monwealth and the states between them have full legislative competence
and that the Commonwealth could ask the states to implement treaty
obligations involves the possibility that the states could refuse to control
private citizens."5 8 In both Koowarta and the Tasmanian Dam Case
states were by their own action allegedly breaching treaty obligations.
Justice Stephen took a compromise position in Koowarta.159 The
existence of a treaty was neither conclusive (as Justices Mason, Murphy
and Brennan would have it)"6 nor irrelevant (as Chief Justice Gibbs and
Justices Aickin and Wilson would have it).' 6 ' Justice Stephen took the
view that a treaty could generate a correlative legislative power but
would not do so unless the subject matter of the treaty were one of inter-
national concern.' 62  In this he referred to limitations which had been
suggested for the treaty-making power of the United States Constitu-
tion.' 63 He went on to conclude that enough evidence of international
concern about racial discrimination existed for the convention to gener-
ate a correlative legislative power.' 64
In the Tasmanian Dam Case, Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Wil-
son and Dawson 65 accepted that the Koowarta decision had foreclosed
the approach taken by Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Aickin and Wil-
son in Koowarta.'66 These judges accepted Justice Stephen's reasons in
Koowarta as the ratio decidendi of the case, and Justice Dawson assumed
158 Discussed further infra, text accompanying notes 261-64.
159 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 453.
160 39 Austl. L.R. at 464 (Mason, J.); id. at 488-89, 494-95 (Brennan, J.).
161 In the Tasmanian Dam Case Justice Dawson expressed the opinion (1) that Justice Stephen
had taken the same position in Koowarta as that taken by Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Aickin
and Wilson regarding the effect of a treaty on the external affairs power-that a treaty can only be
implemented if its subject matter would be within the external affairs power in the absence of the
treaty; and (2) that it was only because Justice Stephen disagreed with Chief Justice Gibbs and
Justices Aickin and Wilson on the issue of what would suffice to bring a subject matter within the
external affairs power absent a treaty that Justice Stephen joined Justices Mason, Murphy and Bren-
nan to uphold the Racial Discrimination Act's provisions. 46 Austl. L.R. at 844-45. This writer was
once compelled by that construction of Justice Stephen's opinion in Koowarta because of the
passages at 39 Austl. L.R. at 453-54. However, the writer is now in agreement with those members
of the Court in the Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 669-70 (Gibbs, C.J.), id. at 743-744
(Wilson, J.); id. at 771 (Brennan, J.) who read Justice Stephen as having treated the presence of a
treaty obligation as being a relevant but not a conclusive factor. This interpretation can be inferred
from the fact that Justice Stephen reserved the question on whether the Commonwealth could have
legislated even if Australia were not a party to the Convention. Koowarta, Austl. L.R. at 456.
162 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 453.
163 Id. at 452-53. For one author's view of such limitations, see L. HENKIN, supra note 29, at
151-56.
164 39 Austl. L.R. at 454-56.
165 46 Austl. L.R. at 670, 752, 841 respectively.
166 See supra text accompanying note 150.
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them to be such for the purposes of argument.1 67 They pointed out that
Justice Stephen seemed to treat the issue of international concern as one
of degree.168 Their Honours were able to distinguish Koowarta on the
basis that more international concern exists about racial discrimination
than about preservation of the world's cultural and natural heritage.
1 69
Further, what international concern existed for preservation of the
world's cultural and natural heritage was insufficient for a treaty on the
subject to generate a correlative legislative power.170
In deciding that international concern about cultural and natural
heritage was insufficient to bring it within power, Justice Wilson
commented:
When it is said that the subject matter of the Convention is a mat-
ter of international concern it may be relevant in judging the strength
of that concern to observe that to date 74 nations have become parties
to it; that is to say, a little less than half the total membership of the
United Nations. Furthermore, there are some notable absentees from
the list of parties, including the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union,
China, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Japan, New Zealand, Sin-
gapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Phillipines.
17 1
Apparently, for Justice Wilson at least, the concern of some nations is
less significant than is the concern of other nations. It is, with respect,
quite inappropriate for the judiciary to make comparisons which could
embarrass the conduct of Australia's international relations.
It is ironic that Justice Wilson, to strengthen his argument in
Koowarta that no weight could be given to the existence of a treaty, had
asserted that it would be impossible to distinguish one kind of interna-
tional obligation from another and that if the International Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination could be imple-
mented, then all international obligations would be within power.
1 72
Feeling compelled in the Tasmanian Dam Case to accept Justice Ste-
phen's position as representing the ratio decidendi of Koowarta, Justice
Wilson adapted to the task of finding distinctions. 1
73
In the Tasmanian Dam Case, as already noted, Justices Mason,
Murphy, Brennan and Deane took the view that a treaty would per se
167 46 Austl. L.R. at 670 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 743-44 (Wilson, J.); id at 844-45 (Dawson, J.).
168 Id. at 670 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 753 (Wilson, J.); id. at 844 (Dawson, J.).
169 46 Austl. L.R. at 670-71 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 473 (Wilson, J.); id. at 845-46 (Dawson, J.).
170 Id. at 670-71 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 743, 753 (Wilson, J.); id. at 848 (Dawson, J.).
171 Id. at 750
172 39 Austi. L.R. at 478-79.
173 However, in doing so, his Honour commented: "I do not regard this as a satisfactory
interpretation of the power, but consistently with existing authority it would appear to be the best
that can be done." 46 Austl. L.R. at 753.
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generate a correlative legislative power. 74 However, these judges each
took different approaches in explaining their reasons for rejecting Justice
Stephen's approach and for rejecting other compromises which would
allow treaties to be relevant but not conclusive. 17 5
For Justice Brennan, Justice Stephen's approach of requiring both
that there be a treaty and that there be international concern about the
subject matter of the treaty failed to acknowledge that the treaty itself
was evidence of the concern of the parties thereto. 176 Justice Mason also
took this point, 177 but he introduced another level of argument. Justice
Mason stated:
Whether the subject matter as dealt with by the Convention is of inter-
national concern, whether it will yield, or is capable of yielding, a bene-
fit to Australia, whether non-observance by Australia is likely to lead
to adverse international action or reaction, are not questions on which
the Court can readily arrive at an informed opinion. Essentially they
are issues involving nice questions of sensitive judgment which should
be left to the Executive Government for determination. The Court
should accept and act upon the decision of the Executive Government
and upon the expression of the will of Parliament in giving legislative
ratification to the treaty or convention. 178
This passage is unremarkable insofar as it indicates that whether or
not governmental action is "beneficial" is entirely a political issue on
which courts must accept the decisions of the executive and legislature.
What is remarkable, indeed radical, about this passage is that it reaches
the same conclusion concerning issues such as whether a subject matter
is of international concern and whether a subject matter is likely to affect
Australia's international relations. If this willingness to accept executive
and legislative decisions on these matters were carried over to situations
where no relevant treaty existed, then the Commonwealth executive and
legislature would be the sole judges of the parameters of Commonwealth
legislative power under section 51(xxix). It is one thing to accept that,
because of the nature of the subject matter of power in section 51(xxix),
actions by Australia's international representative can increase Common-
wealth legislative power. It is quite another to say that, on questions of
fact relevant to the existence of Commonwealth power, the opinion of the
Commonwealth Executive and/or Parliament can be conclusive. It is
174 See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
175 The other submissions are summarized by Justice Mason, 46 Austl. L.R. at 690.
176 Id. at 771.
177 Id. at 691. Justice Mason rejected not only Justice Stephen's approach, but also all sugges-
tions that 1) only those treaties which would benefit Australia could be implemented; and 2) only
those treaties requiring observance to forestall adverse international reaction could be implemented.
Id. at 692.
178 Id. at 692.
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axiomatic in the constitutional tradition of Australia that the existence of
constitutional facts is a matter for the judiciary. 179 The approach of Jus-
tice Brennan is more consistent with the principle of judicial review of
constitutionality: if there is in fact international concern about a subject
matter then the subject matter will be within the ambit of section
5 l(xxix), the existence of a treaty being strong evidence that the interna-
tional parties to the treaty are in fact concerned about its subject matter.
So far the discussion has referred cryptically to the possibility of a
correlative legislative power generated by the existence of a treaty. Ear-
lier cases had indicated that if legislation bases its constitutional validity
on the existence of a treaty obligation, then the operative provisions of
the legislation will be valid only if they are an implementation of the
treaty obligation.180
In Koowarta it was conceded both that the relevant treaty (The In-
ternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination) created "obligations" and that the Commonwealth
legislation was a fulfillment of those treaty obligations.' 81 In the Tasma-
nian Dam Case, however, both points were disputed.
IV. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION
Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Wilson took the view that the only
relevant obligation could be an obligation under international law.' 82
Mere political or moral obligations could not generate power.' 83 Under
the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage' 84, Australia had no international legal obligation to protect
any part of its national heritage because the enforcement of its provisions
was entirely discretionary.' 85 Furthermore, the possibility of legislative
power being generated from the existence of customary international law
179 Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth, 83 C.L.R. 1 (1951). Justice Murphy
weakened the force of this axiom in the Tasmanian Dam Case by arguing that the existence of facts
necessary for constitutional validity is to be presumed until rebutted. 46 Austl. L.R. at 726. Justice
Brennan suggests that the opinion of the Executive about issues of fact relevant to the existence of
external affairs power, would have to be, at least, relevant. Id. at 771.
180 See the references collected by Chief Justice Gibbs in the Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl.
L.R. at 671-74.
181 39 Austl. L.R. at 456 (Stephen, J.). Chief Justice Gibbs seemed, however, to regard the
issue of implementation as still being open. Id. at 442.
182 46 Austl. L.R. at 663 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 745-46 (Wilson, J.).
183 46 Austl. L.R. at 663, 674 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 745-46, 749 (Wilson, J.).
184 46 Austl. L.R. at 663, 674 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 745-46, 749 (Wilson, J.).
185 Id. at 660-61 (Gibbs C.J.); id. at 747-49 (Wilson, J.). Justice Dawson clearly sympathized
with much of what Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Wilson had to say on these issues, but rested his
decision on his finding that there was insufficient international concern about the subject matter of
the treaty. Id. at 846, 848, 850-51.
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was cut off by their Honours' finding that there was no relevant custom-
ary international law.
The majority judges-Justices Mason, Murphy, Brennan and De-
ane-found that the Convention did create relevant international legal
obligations. In particular, it created an obligation to protect property on
the World Heritage List. I"6 These judges emphasized that "obligation"
is a much looser concept in international relations and in international
law than it is in Australian domestic law."8 7 Their Honours also com-
mented that it was probably not a prerequisite for the "implementation"
of a treaty that the treaty create obligations.' 8 Justice Deane empha-
sized again the nature of the subject matter of power as it pertained to
Australia's relations with other countries with this comment: "IT]he re-
sponsible conduct of external affairs in today's world will, on occasion,
require observance of the spirit as well as the letter of international agree-
ments, compliance with recommendations of international agencies and
pursuit of international objectives which cannot be measured in terms of
binding obligations."'8 9
V. FEDERAL CLAUSE
Interacting with the question of whether or not the Convention did
create a relevant obligation was the issue of the significance of the federal
clause, article 34, in the Convention. That clause provides:
The following provisions shall apply to those States parties to this Con-
vention which have a federal or nonunitary constitutional system:
(a) with regard to the provisions of this Convention, the implementa-
tion of which comes under the legal jurisdiction of the federal or cen-
tral legislative power, the obligations of the federal or central
government shall be the same as for those states parties which are not
federal states:
(b) with regard to the provisions of this convention the implementation
of which comes under the legal jurisdiction of individual constituent
states, countries, provinces or cantons that are not obliged by the con-
stitutional system of the federation to take legislative measures, the
federal government shall inform the competent authorities of such
states, countries, provinces or cantons of the said provisions, with its
recommendation for their adoption. 190
186 Id. at 698 (Mason, J.); ia at 734-35 (Murphy, J.); id at 775, 778 (Brennan, J.); id. at 807-08
(Deane, J.).
187 Id. at 734-35 (Murphy, J.); id. at 776-79 (Brennan, J.); id. at 807 (Deane, J.).
188 Justice Mason considered that the legislation could be upheld on the alternative ground
that it was a means of securing to Australia the benefit of having other nations protect their world
heritage sites. Id. at 695-96, 700; id. at 734 (Murphy, J.); id. at 774 (Brennan, J.); id. at 805-06
(Deane, J.).
189 Id. at 805. See also id. at 777 (Brennan, J.).
190 Id. at 658.
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For the majority, the Commonwealth had power to legislate under
section 51 (xxix) to fulfill its international treaty obligations and therefore
article 34(a) applied. 191 Chief Justice Gibbs in dissent, however, raised
and reserved the question of whether article 34(a) could impose an obli-
gation which was conditional on the existence of a central government
power which was itself conditioned on the existence of the obligation. 92
If article 34 were so construed, then article 34(b) could never apply in
Australia. His Honour suggested that article 34(a) should be construed
to apply if the central government would have power to implement with-
out recourse to an external affairs power.193 It is, with respect, difficult
to see why Chief Justice Gibbs felt that article 34(b) of the Convention
should be read so as to apply to Australia. 194 Australia is not the only
federation in the world. It is probable, for example, that article 34(b)
would apply to Canada's position. 195 In any case, article 34 was appro-
priate to the problems of the Australian federation at the time the Con-
vention was drafted because of the uncertainty existing in Australia at
that time about the constitutional position.
Justice Dawson, also in dissent, stated that had he found it neces-
sary to decide whether the Convention did impose obligations on the
Commonwealth, he would have found that the treaty did not impose any
relevant obligations on the Commonwealth under the federal clause.' 96
It is not clear whether his Honour was accepting the construction of arti-
cle 34 suggested by Chief Justice Gibbs or whether he was stating the
circular proposition that the Commonwealth lacked implementing power
and article 34(b) applied, because of (rather than as an alternative to) his
holding that the external affairs power could not be used to implement
the treaty in issue because the subject matter of the treaty involved insuf-
ficient international concern. 19
7
The other dissenting judge, Justice Wilson, proceeded, as did the
majority judges, on the basis that the operation of article 34 in relation to
Australia depended on the content of the Commonwealth's external af-
fairs power, rather than on the basis that the content of the external af-
fairs power depended on article 34.19' His Honour did, however, find
that the conciliatory tone of article 34 reinforced his conclusion that
191 Id. at 700 (Mason, J.); id. at 735 (Murphy, J.); id. at 779 (Brennan, J.); id. at 808-09 (De-
ane, J.).
192 Id. at 674.
193 Id..
194 Compare the opinion of Justice Brennan on this point. Id. at 679.
195 See supra note 153.
196 46 Austl. L.R. at 850-51.
197 See supra text accompanying notes 166-69 for Justice Dawson's ground for decision.
198 46 Austl. L.R. at 750.
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other provisions of the Convention were not imposing obligations. 199
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
It is noteworthy that all of the majority judges (who otherwise took
a broad view of the external affairs power) accepted without question the
limiting requirement that legislation under the external affairs power
based on the existence of a treaty obligation can be valid only to the
extent that it is an implementation of the treaty obligation. 0° In part,
this rule is traceable to the idea that if a subject matter is only within
power because the Commonwealth has undertaken treaty obligations re-
lating thereto, then it is only to the extent that the subject matter has
been dealt with by the treaty that it is brought within power.2 0 So much
can be readily accepted and would explain a requirement that the subject
matters of a treaty and legislation at least correspond. That reasoning
does not, however, explain why the Commonwealth legislature is limited
to enacting legislation carrying out its treaty obligations.20 2
The Commonwealth can use other powers to legislate in breach of
international law.2 0 3 Why should it not be able similarly to use the exter-
nal affairs power? The criterion of validity for the external affairs power
is relevance to Australia's relations with other countries. What would be
more relevant to Australia's relations with other countries than legislat-
ing in breach of international treaty obligations? Why can not the Parlia-
ment legislate under the external affairs power to aggravate Australia's
relations with another country? It is, indeed, very often the case that
aggravating relations with one country improves relations with another
country.
How is this rule-that if the Commonwealth legislates in reliance on
the existence of a treaty then it must legislate to implement the treaty-to
be explained? The original authors of the rule may have been influenced
by the use in the United States of the necessary and proper clause to
legislate to fulfill non-self-executing treaties. The original authors of the
rule may also have been influenced by a federal consideration that the
199 Id. at 750-51. Contrast Justice Mason who considered that article 34 assumed that other
provisions in the Convention created obligations. Id. at 699.
200 Id. at 696-97 (Mason, J.); id. at 730 (Murphy, J.), id. at 782-83 (Brennan, J.); id. at 805
(Deane, J.).
201 Compare The Queen v. Burgess; Ex parte Henry, 55 C.L.R. 608, 688 (1936) per Justices
Evatt and McTiernan: "[lit is only because and precisely so far as, the Commonwealth statute or
regulations represent the carrying into local operation of the relevant portion of the international
convention that the Commonwealth Parliament or Executive can deal at all with the subject matters
of the convention." (Emphasis added).
202 The majority judges laid to rest the suggestion that treaty implementation was an all or
nothing matter. The Commonwealth can legislate for partial implementation. Tasmanian Dam
Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 730 (Murphy, J.); id. at 783-84 (Brennan, J.); id. at 812-13 (Deane, J.).
203 Polites v. Commonwealth, 70 C.L.R. 60 (1945).
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rule would reduce encroachment upon the state domain.2 "4 If such a
federal consideration does exist, then it is even more surprising that Jus-
tices Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane accepted the implementation
requirement without question when they also purported to exclude fed-
eral considerations from the determination of the content of the external
affairs power.20 5
Whatever the motivation of the original authors of the rule, the rule
is not finely attuned to protecting the interests of the states. To the ex-
tent that the rule reduces the range of legislation that the Commonwealth
can enact in reliance on the existence of a treaty it protects state interests.
It may be, however, that the rule will prevent the Commonwealth from
authorizing those who administer implementing legislation to take ac-
count of state interests. Or, at least that is what Justice Brennan's appli-
cation of the requirement of implementation in the Tasmanian Dam Case
would seem to indicate.
Justice Brennan considered that some of the Commonwealth provi-
sions, which apply to all World Heritage sites in Australia, were invalid
because they were too broad. According to Justice Brennan, it was in the
nature of preservation of property that protective measures be adapted to
the individual property.2 "6 For Justice Brennan, legislative provisions
prohibiting persons from engaging in excavating, drilling, erecting build-
ings, destroying buildings, damaging trees, constructing roads, or using
explosives on a World Heritage site without the consent of the Common-
wealth Minister were not justifiable as an implementation of an obliga-
tion toprotect world heritage sites.207 It might be that protection of a site
would require, for example, the demolition of a building on the site.20 1
An overly broad prohibition might be saved by provisions making its
operation subject to being lifted by administrative action according to
acceptable criteria. Apparently Justice Brennan was satisfied that the
Minister's discretion to consent to activities on heritage sites was con-
fined so that the discretion would be exercised only by considerations
204 See, e.g., The Queen v. Burgess, Exparte Henry, 55 C.L.R. at 688 (Evatt and McTiernan,
JJ.). "Any departure from such a requirement would be completely destructive of the general
scheme of the Commonwealth Constitution" Justice Evatt, the likely author of this joint judgment,
blended internationalist and state rights sympathies. For an overview of Evatt's approach to consti-
tutional issues see Zines, Mr. Justice Evatt and the Constitution, 3 FEDERAL L. REv. 153 (1969); see
also the Tasmanian Dam Case where Chief Justice Gibbs bases the requirement of correlative imple-
mentation on federal considerations of minimizing the expansion of Commonwealth power. 46
Austl. L.R. at 674.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
206 Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 786. Other areas of Australia are also on the
World Heritage List. Id. at 730.
207 World Heritage Act §§ 9(l)(a)-(g), 9(2).
208 46 Austl. L.R. at 786.
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relevant to protection of the site. 09 However, Justice Brennan found this
broad legislation invalid because it did not guarantee that there would be
an accessible administrative framework for responding to applications for
consent to engage in activities on heritage sites.210 It is not clear whether
Justice Brennan was concerned that administrative problems could pre-
vent consent being granted to do acts necessary to protect a site or
whether he was concerned that administrative problems could prevent
consent being obtained to do acts which were simply neutral and irrele-
vant to protection.2 '
Justice Deane also held some of the blanket prohibitions212 inva-
lid.213 His concern, however, was not with their potential to hinder the
fulfillment of the international obligation of preserving heritage sites, but
rather with their severity and drastic effect.21 4 Justice Deane required
that there be a "proportionality" between the international obligation
and the legislative action taken to implement that obligation.21l This
seems to contemplate a balancing of the effects that the legislation may
have relevant to implementing the international obligation against other
effects of the legislation.
Justices Mason and Murphy took an opposing view and would have
upheld all the relevant legislative provisions as being calculated to pro-
tect heritage sites. 1 6 Since Justices Brennan217 and Deane21 8 upheld
209 Id. at 786-87.
210 Id. at 787
211 Id. His Honour relied on Armstrong v. Victoria, 93 C.L.R. 264, 281 (1955), a case address-
ing the question of what licensing requirements can be imposed on interstate carriage consistent with
section 92 of the Constitution which declares that "trade, commerce and intercourse among the
States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free" This
requirement, that any licensing system be readily accessible, is derived from the fact that section 92
is a guarantee of freedom to traders. Principles derived in that context do not seem truly analogous
to the problem of establishing the nexus between a law and a subject matter of power. Hitherto the
possibilities that the difficulty of challenging exercises of administrative discretion could result in a
law operating in situations irrelevant to the grant of power supporting the law has not been seen as a
sufficient reason for denying validity to the law. See Dawson v. Commonwealth, 73 C.L.R. 157, 182
(Dixon, J.) (1946).
212 World Heritage Act § 9(l)(a)-(g).
213 46 Austl. L.R. at 811.
214 Id. at 810-12.
215 Id. at 806.
216 Id. at 702-03, 706-07 (Mason, J.); id. at 735-36 (Murphy, J.).
217 Id. at 787-88. His Honour would have upheld both the regulations promulgated in 1983
under the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act of 1975, and the power in section 9(l)(h) of
the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act of 1983 to prohibit particular acts in relation to
particular properties.
218 Id. at 812. Justice Deane would have upheld both section 9(1)(h) and section 9(2) of the
World Heritage Properties Conservation Act of 1983. His Honour considered that the regulations
made in 1983 under the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act of 1975 were within the
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some of the provisions, enough of the legislation219 was upheld to stop
dam construction. The wider significance of this disagreement among
the majority judges on the question of "implementation" is that it weak-
ens the decision in the Tasmanian Dam Case for the purposes of prece-
dent and complicates any future attempts to legislate to implement treaty
obligations. Moreover, the disagreement provides opportunities, espe-
cially in Justice Deane's notion of "proportionality," for the explicit or
implicit limiting of Commonwealth power by the judiciary.
Finally, under the heading of "implementation," mention needs to
be made of the following passage in the judgment of Justice Mason in the
Tasmanian Dam Case:
The fact that the power may extend to the subject matter of the treaty
before it is made or adopted by Australia, because the subject matter
has become a matter of international concern to Australia, does not
mean that Parliament may depart from the provisions of the treaty
after it has been entered into by Australia and enact legislation which
goes beyond the treaty or is inconsistent with it.220
While this passage may simply have been intended to reserve this issue
for later consideration, it might be construed to state that entering into a
treaty will circumscribe and perhaps reduce the extent to which a subject
matter, otherwise inherently relevant to Australia's international rela-
tions, can be dealt with under the external affairs power. Such a proposi-
tion is inconsistent with a statement which Justice Murphy had made in
the Seas and Submerged Lands Case221 to the effect that if a subject mat-
ter is inherently within the external affairs power, then legislation dealing
with that subject matter need not correspond to a treaty on the subject
matter.222 Mr. Justice Murphy's approach would seem to accord with
principle. As already noted, international law does not operate as an
overriding constraint on exercises of Commonwealth power.223 Further-
more, the test of validity for laws based on the external affairs power is
relevance to international relations.22g If evidence or judicial notice,
apart from a treaty, reveals how laws are in fact relevant to international
relations, why should that evidence/judicial notice be ignored simply be-
cause a treaty is not as revealing? The treaty is evidence of the concern
of its signatories about its subject matter.225 It is by no means evidence
external affairs power but offended section 5 1(xxxi)'s requirement that acquisitions of property be on
just terms. Id. at 821, 828.
219 World Heritage Act § 9(1)(h).
220 46 Austl. L.R. at 697.
221 New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 135 C.L.R. 337 (1975).
222 Id. at 504.
223 See supra text accompanying note 203.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 113-81.
225 In principle, if nations are parties to a treaty, the Commonwealth should be able to refer to
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that the parties are not concerned about subject matters not dealt with,
nor is it evidence that the parties are only concerned about the subject
matter of the treaty to the extent that the treaty deals with it.
VII. GENERAL LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF SECTION 51(xxix)
To this point, only the limitations inherent in the nature of the sub-
ject matter of power in section 51(xxix) have been discussed. Other limi-
tations, however, do exist on the use of section 5 l(xxix) which apply both
to treaty implementation and to legislation dealing with matters inher-
ently relevant to Australia's international relations.
The legislative power in section 51(xxix) is, like all others in section
51, governed by the proviso "subject to this constitution." '226 Therefore,
whatever the prima facie content of section 5 l(xxix), the power could not
be exercised to breach express provisions in the Constitution (such as
section 51(xxxi),22 7 section 92228 and section 116229) or implied prohibi-
tions.23° Justice Murphy has indicated23' that he would be willing to
make implications into the Constitution to protect basic liberties from
exercises of governmental power, including legislation under section
51(xxix). However, he has had no support in this cause. The only estab-
lished category of implications limiting exercises of Commonwealth
power are those drawn from the federal nature of the Constitution which
prohibits the Commonwealth from exercising its powers so as to discrim-
that fact to demonstrate the existence of international concern about the subject matter of the treaty
and thus bring the subject matter within the reach of section 51(xxix) even if Australia is not party to
the treaty. See supra text accompanying notes 129-3 1.
226 See the language introducing section 51, supra text accompanying note 7. The U.S. power
to make law by making treaties is not expressly so limited. U.S. CONST. art. VI. Fears that interna-
tional treaties might override constitutional limitations contributed to the proposal of the Bricker
Amendment. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 252-53 (10th ed. 1980). Justice Black speak-
ing for the majority in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957), allayed those fears by stating that
any treaty law would have to comply with the Constitution.
227 See supra note 4.
228 "On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce and intercourse among
the States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free."
AusTL. CONST. ch. iv, § 92. See also the discussion and references supra note 27.
229 "The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing
any religious observance, of for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test
shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth." AUSTL.
CONST. ch. v, § 116. For a U.S. Supreme Court opinion holding that the treaty power cannot confer
power free of other constitutional restraints, see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
230 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 432-33 (Gibbs, C.J, Aickin and Wilson, JJ., concurring); id. at
450, 452 (Stephen, J.); ia. at 460 (Mason, J.); id at 472 (Murphy, J.). Tasmanian Dam Case, 46
Austl. L.R. at 695 (Mason, J.); id at 801 (Deane, J.).
231 Koowarta, 39 Aust]. L.R. at 472. For a discussion of Justice Murphy's general approach to
constitutional issues, see Bickovskii, No Deliberate Innovators Mr. Justice Murphy and the Austra-
lian Constitution, 8 FEDERAL L. REv. 460 (1977).
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inate against the states or to threaten the continued existence of the states
as such.232 Neither of these federal implications has yet settled to any
precise content.
Because of the issues raised before the Court on demurrer in
Koowarta, the Court did not have to uphold the validity of the applica-
tion of the Commonwealth legislation to states.233 In the Tasmanian
Dam Case, however, issues of intergovernmental immunity did arise.
The majority in the Tasmanian Dam Case held that the application of
the Commonwealth legislative provisions to the state actions involved
did not offend any federal implication.234 Apparently, being able to build
a hydroelectric dam on Crown land was not, for the majority, essential to
the existence of a state "as such." '235 This was true even though: (1) the
state government considered the construction of the dam to be essential
to the economic survival of the state; (2) state governments in Australia
have traditionally provided utilities; (3) the devolution of control of
wastelands was a central aspect of the development of colonial self-gov-
ernment; (4) control of wastelands involves royal prerogatives and (5) a
large area of the state was affected by the Commonwealth legislation.236
Those majority judges who did discuss the opaque formula "as
such" treated it as being merely a structural guarantee. That is, a mere
guarantee of the continued existence of the basic organs of the state gov-
ernment-the judiciary, the executive and the legislature-rather than a
guarantee of freedom to engage in activities traditionally or characteristi-
cally carried on by state government.237
232 Victoria v. Commonwealth (The Payroll Tax Case); 122 C.L.R. 353 (1971). Koawarta, 39
Austl. L.R. at 433 (Gibbs, C.J., Aickin and Wilson, JJ concurring); id. at 452 (Stephen, J.); id. at 460
(Mason, J.); id. at 472 (Murphy, J.). Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 695, 703-05 (Mason,
J.); id. at 728 (Murphy, J.), 752 (Wilson, J.); 767 (Brennan, J.). Justice Deane put it no more
strongly than to accept the existence of such implications for the purpose of argument. Id. at 823-24.
233 Chief Justice Gibbs, although holding the legislation invalid on other grounds (see supra
text accompanying notes 132-34, and 150-56), expressly said that the "provisions" of the legislation
did not prevent a state from continuing to exist and function. 39 Austl. L.R. at 475. Although
Justice Wilson (along with Justice Aickin) expressed agreement with the reasoning as well as the
conclusion of the Chief Justice, his Honour also noted without explaining their relevance, some
decisions and statements of the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 475. Justice Wilson described
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1975), as a decision by the Supreme Court which
"restrained Congress from wielding its commerce power in a fashion that would impair the States'
ability to function effectively in a federal system." Id. The Usery decision has recently been over-
ruled. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (1985).
234 46 Austl. L.R. at 703-05 (Mason, J.); id. at 728 (Murphy, J.); id. at 765-68 (Brennan, J.); id.
at 823-24 (Deane, J.).
235 46 Austl. L.R. at 703-05 (Mason, J.); id at 728 (Murphy, J.); id. at 765-68 (Brennan, J.); id
at 823-24 (Deane, J.).
236 The fullest discussion of these factors is that of Justice Brennan. Id. at 760-66.
237 Id. at 703 (Mason, J.). See also the opinion of Justice Brennan where he said that a state
might have grounds for invoking a federal implication of immunity if the Commonwealth provisions
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Since the minority judges held that the legislation was not law with
respect to external affairs, no comment was necessary on the implied con-
stitutional guarantee of continued existence to the states.238 Justice Wil-
son did, however, seek to draw from the guarantee of continued state
existence a guarantee to the states of a freedom to govern, through exer-
cises of legislative and executive power, subject matters traditionally gov-
erned by state government. For His Honour, the mere existence of the
possibility of preemptive Commonwealth legislation applying to private
citizens was itself an unacceptable interference with this state freedom to
govern. 239 This perception reinforced his Honour's conclusion that the
Commonwealth Executive could not bring subject matters within Com-
monwealth legislative power simply by incurring treaty obligations.24 °
Thus, His Honour ran together the two aspects of federalism-the con-
tinued separate existence of states and the division of legislative author-
ity- identified at the commencement of this article.241
The proposition that the continued existence of states necessarily
involves the exclusion of the central government from the regulation of
some subject matters does carry some force. Indeed, that was the essence
of the view of the majority of the High Court until 1920.242 Justice Wil-
son's argument contains two principle difficulties. First, the early view of
the High Court was discredited in 1920.243 Second, the trend in High
Court judgments since 1920 has been to distinguish the problem of deter-
mining when a law relates to subject matters of Commonwealth legisla-
tive power from the problem of determining when particular exercises of
Commonwealth power will offend the federal nature of the Constitution
in their application to states.2'
Another significant limitation on the use of section 51(xxix) is that
any legislation must be endorsed by a majority of both Houses of Coin-
were applied to the buildings that house the principal organs of a state. Id. at 767. This reminds one
of dicta in New York v. United States (the Saratoga Springs Case), 326 U.S. 572, 587-88 (1945).
238 46 Austl. L.R. at 685 (Gibbs, C.J.); id. at 859 (Dawson, J.).
239 Id. at 752.
240 Id.
241 See supra text accompanying note 1.
242 See, eg., D'Emden v. Pedder, 1 C.L.R. 91 (1904); The Queen v. Barger, 6 C.L.R. 41 (1908);
Union Label Case, 6 C.L.R. 469 (1908).
243 Engineer's Case, 28 C.L.R. 129 (1920).
244 This trend is exemplified by the majority judgments in the Tasmanian Dam Case. It is a
trend also supported in the past, however, by Sir Harry Gibbs. See generally his judgments in the
Payroll Tax Case, 122 C.L.R. 353 (1971) and Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd. v. Commonwealth,
136 C.L.R. 1 (1976). It is a trend which has its parallels in the U.S. Supreme Court approach in the
case of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), from which Justice Wilson sought to
draw support. Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 475, discussed supra at note 233. The Usery decision has
recently been overruled. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 53 U.S.L.W. 4135
(1985).
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monwealth Parliament. 45 Although the lower house (whose confidence
determines, according to British principles, who controls executive gov-
ernment) is structured so that seats are allocated to states according to
the relative size of their populations,246 the upper house, the Senate, is
federally structured. Each state is guaranteed an equal number of Sena-
tors (currently twelve) in the Senate regardless of population.247 Sena-
tors are elected directly by the people of each state.2 4 As might be
expected from the British background of disciplined party voting, voting
within the Australian Senate has traditionally been along party lines. All
political parties must, however, take account of the possibility that their
policies, while acceptable to the majority of the Australian population,
might provoke regional displeasure which could manifest itself in voting
for Senate representation. Furthermore, alienating one of the six states
of the Australian federation is relatively more significant to the party
system in the Australian States House, than is alienating one of the fifty
states represented in the U.S. Senate.
Furthermore, federal politicians who depend for their election on
party backing cannot help but be aware that their actions at the federal
level may affect the electoral prospects of their party colleagues who are
seeking office at state levels. By capitalizing on resentment of central
government "bullying," votes can be picked up at the state level.
A firm political commitment would be required, therefore, for any
Commonwealth government to use the external affairs power to create
Commonwealth law on any topic where either regional opposition to the
policy of the legislation, or an existing state framework of regulation with
its associated entrenched interests, exists.24 9 When assessing the possible
245 AuSTL. CONsr. § 23 (Senate), § 40 (House of Representatives).
246 Ausm. CONST. § 24. This principle is qualified by a guarantee that each original state
shall have at least five members. Id. Tasmania has benefited from the provision because on a popu-
lation basis Tasmania would otherwise only have been entitled to four members.
247 AUSTL. CONST. § 7. The "federal" principle of the Parliament and of the Senate in particu-
lar has been qualified by the exercise of section 122 of the Constitution to introduce representatives
for Commonwealth territories into both houses of Parliament. See Western Australia v. Common-
wealth, 134 C.L.R. 201 (1975); Queensland v. Commonwealth, 239 C.L.R. 585 (1977).
248 Until the Seventeenth Amendment in 1917 the U.S. Constitution provided for two Senators
to be chosen by the Legislature of each State. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. The Seventeenth Amendment
provides for the election of each State's two Senators to be by the people of the State.
249 For United States analogies, see Wechsler, Political Safeguards of Federalism, 154 COLUM.
L. REv. 543 (1954). The Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.) has traditionally been more willing to
expand central government activity than have the other parties which have held office in the short
history of the Australian federation. The A.L.P. was in office for most of World War II and greatly
expanded central government activity by using the defense power contained in the Constitution.
AusTL. CONST. § 51(vi)). See Sawer, The Defence Power of the Commonwealth in Time of War, 20
AusTL. L.J. 295 (1946). The defense power shrank as did the defense "needs" against which it was
measured. The Queen v. Foster, 79 C.L.R. 43 (1949). The A.L.P. was out of office from 1949 until
1972. For discussion of the A.L.P. government's attempts to expand central government activity in
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political consequences of using the external affairs power, Common-
wealth legislators need to take account of the fact that, as currently con-
stituted, the High Court has three members who will resist expansion of
Commonwealth power on federal grounds."' 0 These three could quite
easily find themselves in a majority, holding Commonwealth legislation
invalid, if one of the "centralist" judges finds that the legislation offends
an implied basic liberty,2 51 is not exactly fitted to a treaty being imple-
mented252 or is disproportionate.25 A decision by the High Court that
legislation is invalid, no matter what the grounds for decision, may well
be perceived by the general populace as a decision that the Common-
wealth action was "wrong."
VIII. WHITHER FEDERALISM IN AUSTRALIA?
It is clear that the states are not about to disappear from the map of
Australia. They have already survived and adapted to other centralising
High Court decisions. The Engineer's Case in 1920 held the states to be
subject to Commonwealth legislation in general and to industrial arbitra-
tion under section 5 l(xxxv) binding states as employers in particular.25 4
The First Uniform Tax Case, decided in 1942255 and confirmed in the
Second Uniform Tax Case in 1956,256 acknowledged that the Common-
wealth has power to deprive the states of financial independence and to
reduce states to mere conduits for Commonwealth spending.
It is also clear that "federalism" is not about to disappear from High
Court decisions concerning the content of the external affairs power.
The preceding discussion has indicated that a number of contentious is-
sues remain concerning the content of the external affairs power and that
the resolution of these issues may depend on explicit or implicit federal
considerations.
For all these qualifications, however, there is no doubting the impor-
tance of the decisions in Koowarta and the Tasmanian Dam Case and the
encouragement that these cases give to Commonwealth action. These
the period 1972-1975 see LABOR AND THE CONSTrruTION 1972-1975 (Evans ed. 1977). Lionel
Murphy, now a Justice of the High Court, was associated with many of those attempts in his capac-
ity as Commonwealth Attorney-General from 1972 to 1974. The A.L.P. government which came to
office early in 1983 seems generally to be intent on projecting an image of calm and continuity rather
than of exciting change. But see infra note 252.
250 See supra notes 96-101 and 110-112 and accompanying text. If, for any reason, only six
Justices were to decide a case, in the event of a three-three split the vote of the Chief Justice would
decide the case. Judiciary Act (1903) § 23(2)0b).
251 See supra text accompanying note 231.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 206-11.
253 See supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
254 Engineer's Case, 28 C.L.R. 129 (1920). See generally supra note 112.
255 South Australia v. Commonwealth, 65 C.L.R1 373 (1942).
256 Victoria v. Commonwealth, 99 C.L.R. 575 (1957).
19841
CASE W. RES. J INT'L L
cases demonstrate that the external affairs power can have the same effect
in Australia of centralizing legislative competence as the commerce
power has had in the United States. Doubtless the Commonwealth will
not be in a hurry to sweep aside state regulation in areas such as general
criminal law, testamentary disposition, property and building controls.
These cases do, however, signal that federal politics contains strong ele-
ments which will not tolerate localized action which offends the national
conscience.257 In this the pressures which led to the expansion of the
American Commerce power are paralleled. It is in just such issues, how-
ever, that emotions are most powerfully involved and that local resent-
ment to being told how to live by centralized authority is most intense.25
The American experience with desegregation exemplifies this
intensity.25 9
But even if one accepts that what the Commonwealth sought to
achieve in Koowarta (the elimination of racial discrimination) and in the
Tasmanian Dam Case (the preservation of the South West Tasmanian
wilderness) was worthwhile, the issue remains whether the external af-
fairs power was appropriately construed by the majority judgment, or did
those majority judgments do disproportionate damage to federalism?2"'
This takes us back again to the dominating issue in these cases-
should the potential of the external affairs power be limited so as to pre-
serve a sphere of action exclusively for the states? While the federal
spirit of the Constitution undoubtedly supports such an argument, the
national purpose to the Constitution provides a countervailing point of
view. The minority judges who, whenever their stringent tests for use of
section 5 1(xxix) are not passed, would have the Commonwealth ask the
states to fulfill treaty obligations or legislate for other matters affecting
Australia's international relations,261 would necessarily leave to each
257 There is a possibility that the Federal Labor Government will attempt to use the external
affairs power to enact a Bill of Rights. Gareth Evans, now a Senator and a Minister in the Federal
Labor Government, worked on a similar proposal for an earlier Federal Labor Government. See
generally Evans, Benign Discrimination and the Right to Equality, 6 FEDERAL L. REv. 26 (1974);
Crommelin & Evans in LABOR AND THE CONsTrruTION supra note 49, at 45-50. Such a Bill of
Rights would represent a dramatic change in the nature of government in Australia. It is to be noted
that if it were based on the external affairs power then it would have the same standing as any other
Commonwealth legislation. It would therefore override inconsistent State law but could be repealed
by later Commonwealth enactments. Compare Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 445.
258 Compare the pattern of spirited resistance in cases such as Attorney-General (Victoria) v.
Commonwealth (the Marriage Act Case), 107 C.L.R. 529 (1962) and Gazzo v. Comptroller of
Stamps, 38 Austl. L.R. 25 (1981) to exercises of Commonwealth legislative power with respect to
marriage and divorce. AUTL. CONST. §§ 51(xxi), 51(xxii) respectively.
259 See supra text accompanying notes 96-112.
260 Compare, G. GUNTHER, supra note 226, at 203.
261 In Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 480, Justice Wilson, former Solicitor-General for Western
Australia stated:
The task of ensuring the co-operation of the States may present a political challenge,
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state a veto over Commonwealth decisions concerning Australia's inter-
national relations. It is not a question of whether Australia should act or
not act. It is a question of who should make the decisions about Austra-
lia's international relations. It is difficult to think of an area of govern-
ment, apart from the closely related area of defense,262 where it is so
inappropriate for decisionmaking to be delayed and confused by frag-
mentation 63 and where the ramifications of decisions are so national.z6
In the United States, such considerations have compelled accept-
ance of alternatives to the two-thirds Senate vote. The apparent restric-
tiveness of the text of the U.S. Constitution has not been allowed to
prevent, inter alia, the emergence of the Congressional-Executive agree-
ment which involves (a) the President (necessarily as the nation's inter-
national representative), (b) the House of Representatives
(democratically as the house of the People), and (c) the Senate (federally
as the house of the states, and, it might be added, prudently, as a house of
review).
Under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia there are
no textual obstacles to the use of section 51(xxix) to implement treaties
(or to legislate for other matters of "external affairs") through a similar
democratic and federal structure. As one of the minority judges, Justice
Wilson, himself said in the passage set out2 65 at the commencement of
the article:
The technological revolution in communications coupled with the
search for peace and security during the decades of this century have
led to the close interdependence of nation with nation. Both economi-
cally and socially the earth is now likened to a global village where the
although the developing practice of including State representatives in Commonwealth dele-
gations to international conferences on subjects which may call for implementation by
State legislatures augurs well for future co-operation in the pursuit of an effective foreign
policy and the maintenance of good international relations.
Justice Mason, formerly Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth, had quite a different percep-
tion of the viability of pursuing foreign policy by obtaining consensus of all governments within
Australia:
It is unrealistic to suggest in the light of our knowledge and experience of Commonwealth
State co-operation and of co-operation between the States that the discharge of Australia's
international obligations by legislation can be safely and sensibly left to the States acting
unformly in co-operation.
Id. at 462.
262 Ausm. CONST. § 51(vi) gives legislative power with respect to "The naval and military
defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States .... " See references, supra note 248.
263 See, e.g., Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 459-60 (Mason, J.).
264 Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 431 (1819):
In the legislature of the Union alone, are all represented. The legislature of the Union
alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with the power of controlling measures which
concern all, in the confidence that it will not be abused.
265 See supra text accompanying note 8.
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international community concerns itself increasingly with matters
which formerly were regarded as only of domestic concern.2 66
Those are undoubtedly the facts. The "external affairs" power of the
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia is singularly appropriate
for application to those facts.
266 Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 479.
